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THE INCOMPLETE GLOBAL MARKET FOR
TAX INFORMATION
STEVEN A. DEAN*
Abstract: The United States finds itself facing a growing disparity between
the tax information it collects domestically and the tax information it is
able to acquire from abroad. At the same time, globalization and tech-
nology have made it easier for taxpayers to ignore national borders and
have therefore made the ability to acquire useful extraterritorial tax in-
formation more important than ever. To make the income tax effective in
today's borderless economy, the United States must abandon the anti-
quated notion of information exchange. Creating a more complete mar-
ket-one more likely to facilitate efficient transactions than today's barter
market in extraterritorial tax information-is one possible remedy. The
United States could also choose (1) to promote a supranational effort like
the European Union Savings Directive to facilitate cross-border flows of
tax information, (2) to reduce unilaterally its dependence on extraterri-
torial tax information, or (3) to pursue all of these possibilities simulta-
neously. Any of those strategies would be more likely to ensure that the
United States receives the extraterritorial tax information it needs than
the eighty-year-old barter method in use today.
INTRODUCTION
Information about individuals is bought and sold in ways that
would have been unimaginable just a few decades ago,1 and "a strong
* Copyright © 2008 Steven A. Dean, Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
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Dean's Summer Research Grant and from very helpful suggestions and comments from
Rosanne Altshuler, Edward Cheng, Laura Pomeroy-Gerber, Megan Healey, Edward Janger,
Claire Kelly, Vadim Mahmoudov, Ruth Mason, Chris Serkin, and Dan Shaviro and from the
participants in the Junior Tax Scholars Workshop at Boston University and a Brooklyn Law
School Faculty Workshop. It also benefited from outstanding research assistance from
Diana Sur and Ray Cheng.
I See Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and PersonalData, 117 HARv. L. REv. 2056, 2062
(2004) (describing technologies such as "an implantable chip [that] generates a data trail
by moving about real space, whether in a nursing home, a retail store, or the outdoors"
and noting that "these personal data can be commodified and exchanged for additional
services or special discounts"). New technologies are increasingly enabling "individual
Americans ... [to] participat[e] in the commodification of their personal data." See id. at
2057 & n.3. All sorts of information and related rights (including the right not to receive
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conception of personal data as a commodity is emerging in the United
States."2 As between willing buyers and sellers, those transactions are
presumptively efficient. Because the commodity changing hands is in-
formation, however, those transactions can raise potentially troubling
questions. 3
Typically, the participants in such markets are individuals and
businesses. Governments, although they often rely heavily on informa-
tion, usually do not pay for that information.4 Although they acquire
enormous amounts of valuable information, they tend not to sell it.5
This Article considers one instance in which governments both buy and
sell information and have done so for many years.
The U.S. federal government's fight to close an annual "tax gap"
of as much as $353 billion 6 highlights both its reliance on information
about taxpayers and the limits of its capacity to procure information
that is both timely and useful.7 That information deficit has been iden-
tified as a key obstacle both to reducing taxpayers' use of sophisticated
certain kinds of information) could conceivably be sold in welfare enhancing transactions.
See Ian Ayres & Matthew Funk, Marketing Privacy, 20 YALEJ. ON REG. 77, 96-98 (2003) (pro-
posing the creation of a market that would allow individuals to set a price at which they
would be willing to receive telemarketing calls).
2 Schwartz, supra note 1, at 2057.
3 One unique and particularly troublesome problem is that once information is com-
modified, it can be difficult to maintain control over the ways it is used and who has access
to it. In recent years, scholars have begun to focus on how to create an "information pri-
vacy" regime that can adequately "govern the use, transfer, and processing of personal
data." See id. at 2058. Information privacy is only one of several concerns this Article ad-
dresses. Part TV considers three normative justifications for trading in, and limiting trading
in, taxpayers' information: potential social welfare gains, distributional issues, and infor-
mation privacy. See infra notes 337-411 and accompanying text.
4 The primary exceptions to this rule are payments to those that provide information
useful in law enforcement efforts. See, e.g., Eric Pfanner & Mark Landler, Tax Inquiry? Prin-
cipality is Offended, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 20, 2008, at CI (noting that Germany's intelligence
service bought information related to tax flight from an informant).
One of the most prominent examples of information selling by governments is the
practice of selling personal information collected by state departments of motor vehicles.
See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 143-44 (2000) (describing purpose of the Driver's Pri-
vacy Protection Act of 1994).
6 Max B. Sawicky, Do It Yourself Tax Cuts: The Crisis in U.S. Tax Enforcement, in BRIDGING
THE TAX GAP: ADDRESSING THE CRISIS IN FEDERAL TAX ADMINISTRATION 1, 1 (Max B.
Sawicky ed., 2005). The tax gap, or the amount of unpaid tax, consists predominantly of
underreported income with much smaller contributions from nonfiling and underpay-
ment. Id. at 3.
7 See Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Com-
pliance, 60 STAN. L. Rxv. 695, 698 & n.13 (2007) (discussing importance of information
reporting to taxpayer compliance).
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tax shelters and to preventing garden-variety underreporting.8 Accord-
ingly, important reforms9 and innovative proposals 0 have focused on
narrowing that deficit.
The challenges a government faces in securing access to domes-
tic tax information are even more formidable when the information it
needs to enforce its tax laws rests outside its borders." Governments
must contend with both legal and practical limits on their power to
compel foreign actors to provide them with that extraterritorial tax
information. 2 Domestically, a government may impose ex ante regu-
latory requirements that certain information and transactions be re-
ported by commercial intermediaries 3 and may then compel the pro-
duction of supplemental information that becomes relevant with the
benefit of hindsight.14 Beyond its borders, those government powers
are not reliable.' 5
That limitation has long attracted the attention of international
tax experts.' 6 In recent years, the fall of legal and technological barriers
8 See Alex Raskolnikov; Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-
Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 601-05 (2006); David R. Tillinghast, Issues of
International Tax Enforcement, in THE CRISIS IN TAx ADMINISTRATION 38, 38-39 (HenryJ.
Aaron &Joel Slemrod eds., 2004).
9 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4 (as amended in 2006) (requiring reporting with respect to
potential tax avoidance transactions).
10 See Raskolnikov; supra note 8, at 601-05 (proposing an alternative penalty to combat
tax avoidance).
II See Tillinghast, supra note 8, at 39 (noting that "the largest single source of difficulty
in administering the international aspects of the U.S. tax law is that a large part of the
information the [Internal Revenue Service] needs is not directly available to it").
12 See id. (identifying jurisdictional limitations as a key factor in the Internal Revenue
Service's (the "IRS") information shortage and noting that some statutory requirements
are practically impossible to enforce).
13 Lederman, supra note 7, at 697 (noting that "in a variety of situations, the federal
government requires third parties to report to the government, with a copy to the tax-
payer, amounts the payor transferred to the taxpayer").
14 I.R.C. §§ 7601-7613 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007) (authorizing various investigative
and enforcement powers of IRS including summons and power to execute search and
arrest warrants, among others).
15 See Tillinghast, supra note 8, at 39.
16 See, e.g., U.S. Treasury Dep't, United States Model Income Tax Convention art. 26
(2006) [hereinafter U.S. 2006 Model Convention], available at http://www.ustreas.gov/
press/releases/reports/hp16801.pdf; United Nations, Model Double Tax Convention Be-
tween Developed and Developing Countries art. 26 (2001) [hereinafter U.N. 2001 Model
Convention], available at http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/
unpan002084.pdf; Reports Presented by the Comm. of Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax
Evasion, League of Nations Doc. C.216M.85 1927 1I, at 23 (1927) [hereinafter 1927 Report],
available at http://www.law.wyne.edu/tad/Documents/League/LeagueTech-Experts.pdf;
Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capi-
tal (1963) [hereinafter OECD Double Taxation Draft], reprinted in 1963 AND 1977 ORGANI-
20681
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to international capital flows has transformed a troublesome vulnerabil-
ity into a catastrophic failure of tax .admiiistration. 17 In part because
taxpayers have proven adept at exploiting modern telecommunications
and information technology to hide tax information overseas, global-
ization and technological change have thrust the problem of acquiring
extraterritorial tax information into the spotlight.'8
As is frequently true, governments have proven less nimble than
the private sector and have struggled to keep pace. The primary tool
for gathering extraterritorial tax information is bilateral tax informa-
tion exchange.' 9 Bilateral information exchange provisions allow pairs
of governments to barter with one another, each supplying information
that the other can use to enforce its taxes.20 Pursuant to this barter sys-
tem, one country commits to sending lists of taxpayer-specific informa-
tion to another country in exchange for the right to receive similar lists.
The use of consideration other than tax information is generally not
permitted. 21 This system has proven woefully inadequate.
ZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION DEVELOPMENT MODEL INCOME TAX TREATIES AND
COMMENTARIES: A COMPARATIVE PRESENTATION, at v-xxxi (1987); Org. for Econ. Coopera-
tion & Dev., Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital art. 26
(2005) [hereinafter OECD 2005 Model Convention], available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/50/49/35363840.pdf.
17 See infra notes 138-167 and accompanying text.
18 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") drew at-
tention to the problem posed by the new global environment with its 1998 report on tax
competition. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN
EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 66 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 OECD REPORT], available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/0/1904176.pdf (recognizing that although globalization and
new technologies have brought about prosperity, the new global environment raises "chal-
lenges for governments to minimi[z]e tax induced distortions in investment and financing
decisions and to maintain their tax base"). Considering this and other factors, the OECD
Council recommended continued adoption of tax information exchange. Id. at 65-69.
19 See U.S. 2006 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26; U.N. 2001 Model Conven-
tion, supra note 16, art. 26; OECD 2005 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26.
20 See, e.g., U.S. 2006 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26; U.N. 2001 Model Con-
vention, supra note 16, art. 26; OECD 2005 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26. On a
far smaller scale, these arrangements resemble an agreement between neighbors to water
each other's plants whenever one neighbor is away from home. Although it is not impossi-
ble for such an arrangement to work, it would work best when both neighbors have plants
and both travel. Without a reasonable degree of symmetry, it may not be possible to strike
a mutually satisfactory reciprocal barter arrangement, and plants may go thirsty.
21 The use of cash consideration is outside the scheme under the current bilateral
agreements, which call for mandatory delivery upon request of pertinent information. See
U.S. 2006 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26; U.N. 2001 Model Convention, supra
note 16, art. 26; OECD 2005 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26. An express prohibi-
tion against the use of cash consideration was part of the original League of Nations
model. 1927 Report, supra note 16, at 40.
[Vol. 49:605
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The roots of today's extraterritorial tax information acquisition
system can be traced back to the earliest days of the international tax
regime and the foundational 1927 League of Nations report on inter-
national taxation. 22 Crafted to meet the needs of an era in which in-
ternational transactions and the income tax itself played far more lim-
ited roles, 23 the barter system has fallen short in two very different
respects. It simultaneously works both too well and not well enough.
On the one hand, because the barter system represents a market
in which national governments trade "'bulk' taxpayer information"2 4
with respect to individuals and businesses engaging in cross-border ac-
tivities, it raises important privacy concerns. 2 5 As international com-
merce and investment has grown in importance, the threat to privacy
posed by these exchanges has grown alongside them. 26 Information
exchange now affects a far broader segment of the population than
during the first half of the twentieth century.27 The volume of informa-
tion about privite parties that changes hands between governments
pursuant to information exchange can be immense. 28 In this sense, by
compiling so much potentially sensitive information, the system works
too well.
22 See infra notes 216-244 and accompanying text.
23 See W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 86,
96-97 (1996) (noting that the tax system that emerged out of World War H has remained
the core of federal finance since that time and noting the growth in the tax base under the
new "mass taxation" system). Tax collection through withholding of payroll taxes also en-
tered the system at this time. See id. at 94-96.
24 See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEv., COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MANUAL ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION PROVISIONS FOR TAX PURPOSES, MODULE 3
ON AUTOMATIC (OR ROUTINE) EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION 1-4 (2006) [hereinafter
OECD MANUAL] (describing automatic information exchange and citing sources of law for
countries' automatic exchange of information).
25 See Cynthia Blum, Sharing Bank Deposit Information with Other Countries: Should Tax
Compliance or Privacy Claims Prevail?, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 579, 602-33 (2004). Those privacy
concerns are both a function of the types of data that are exchanged (including social
security numbers) and the increased risk of data security breaches that occur when data is
aggregated and commodified. See generally Paul M. Schwartz & EdwardJ.Janger, Notification
of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913 (2007) (considering efficacy of existing
regulatory regime for notification of data security breaches).
26 See Blum, supra note 25, at 623-33 (discussing privacy concerns particularly relevant
to extraterritorial tax information).
27 See BROWNLEE, supra note 23, at 96-97.
28 The standard OECD electronic information exchange format allows for as many as
104 items of information about each taxpayer and his or her income. See OECD MANUAL,
supra note 24, at 8.
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On the other hand, because by design the market for information
is incomplete,29 potentially beneficial transactions often do not take
place. The market is incomplete in a number of respects: because it is a
barter market" and because, with few exceptions, for most potential
transactions the only available product is raw tax data.3' In their roles as
purchasers, countries have virtually no flexibility regarding the consid-
eration they may use to acquire extraterritorial tax information. 32 As
sellers, they are permitted little choice as to the types of information
they may offer.33 To take a simple example, if extraterritorial tax infor-
mation is the only currency a country were permitted to use to acquire
extraterritorial tax information, how could it be enough for countries
that are, or would like to be, net importers of tax information?
For national governments, the choice is not whether to address the
growing extraterritorial tax information deficit, but how.34 In prior
work, I have argued that wealthy, information-dependent countries
such as the United States could gain better access to tax information by
paying other countries, specifically tax havens, for that access. 35 This
Article takes as its premise that even if every country traditionally
viewed as a tax haven were to disappear overnight, the extraterritorial
tax information deficit would be large and growing. It considers
whether a more complete market for extraterritorial tax information
29 An incomplete market "[e]xist[s] when certain goods-commodities, as well as fi-
nancial assets, insurance, and credit-cannot be contracted for, or only partially so." Dic-
TIONARY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 226 (Craig Calhoun ed., 2002).
3o A "barter" system is a "system of exchange whereby goods or services are exchanged
without the use of money." Id. at 33. Barter systems are "cumbersome and inefficient": in
these systems "not all trades that are desired will be realized ... result[ing] in market inef-
ficiencies." Id. In a barter system, the scope for trade is thus limited to transactions in
which there is a "double coincidence of wants." See id.
3l See, e.g., U.S. 2006 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26; U.N. 2001 Model Con-
vention, supra note 16, art. 26; OECD 2005 Model Convention, su pra note 16, art. 26.
32 See, e.g., U.S. 2006 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26; U.N. 2001 Model Con-
vention, supra note 16, art. 26 (discussing early disallowance of cash consideration for tax
information) OECD 2005 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26. This observation ap-
plies where there is an agreement. In some instances, other policy incentives have served
as consideration for information exchange. See Blum, supra note 25, at 631-32 & n.172
(observing that the "one-sided" agreement between the United States and the Bahamas
provided the United States with tax information and the Bahamas with preferential tax
treatment for conventions held there).
33 The prohibition is implied by the express agreement to exchange only information.
See, e.g., U.S. 2006 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26; U.N. 2001 Model Convention,
supra note 16, art. 26; OECD 2005 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26.
s4 See Tillinghast, supra note 8, at 39.
s5 Steven Dean, Philosopher Kings and International Tax: A New Approach to Tax Havens,
Tax Flight, and International Tax Cooperation, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 911, 957 (2007).
[Vol. 49:605
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could enhance the availability of extraterritorial tax information more
broadly and improve countries' ability to enforce their taxes, in part by
giving them access to ex ante extraterritorial tax information that is
tailored to their unique needs.3 6
Today's information exchange system embraces an outdated, one-
size-fits-all approach.3 7 Grounded in the pre-World War II tax structure,
this exchange system has existed largely unchanged for the better part
of a century as the world has changed around it.38 A more complete
market for extraterritorial tax information, by contrast, would impose
fewer constraints on market participants. It might, for example, sanc-
tion the use of cash consideration and the acquisition of ex ante infor-
mation other than the lists of homogenized "bulk" tax data that have
been the subject of information exchange agreements since the
1920s.3 9 Such a market could allow a government that wishes to be an
importer of extraterritorial tax information to acquire information
carefilly specified to maximize its utility and to minimize its impact on
privacy, and to do so even if it has little or no tax information to "sell."
Likewise, information exporters could establish the terms under, and
the form in, which they are willing to supply that information. Modern
information technology, a key factor in the emergence of a variety of
innovative markets for information in recent years,40 would allow gov-
ernments to produce and acquire extraterritorial tax information that
is both timely and tailored to the requirements of a given tax regime.
Replacing the rudimentary global market for extraterritorial tax
information with a more complete market would provide governments
with improved access to critical information. At the same time, that
transformation could provide other important benefits, including
greater transparency and improved privacy protections. By structuring
the market in a way that compels governments to be open about the
items of information that they buy and sell, and about the prices at
which it changes hands, voters would know precisely what information
their governments are selling and would also be able to ensure that the
market price of that information reflects the true costs of selling it.
36 See infra notes 337-411 and accompanying text (considering proposals to remedy
the incomplete market for extraterritorial tax information).
37 See infra notes 318-336 and accompanying text (describing failure of barter system
to supply sufficient extraterritorial tax information).
s See infra notes 206-317 and accompanying text (describing historical development
of the current information barter system).
39 See infra notes 345-359 and accompanying text (proposing solution for more com-
plete market for tax information).
40 See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 2057.
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Of course, even if a more complete market might be an improve-
ment, it may be that the optimal solution is not more market, but less.
One alternative to creating a more complete market would be to re-
place the existing market with a cooperative intergovernmental ar-
rangement designed to facilitate the cross-border flow of extraterrito-
rial tax information, perhaps in a manner consistent with more robust
privacy protections than a market might provide. 41 Another would be to
make the market irrelevant by consciously reducing the demand for
extraterritorial tax information by redesigning national tax systems. 4 2
Any of those three approaches could strike a better balance between
privacy and enforcement than the current information barter system.
43
Part I of the Article describes the critical role information plays in
modern tax systems.44 It first draws a distinction between ex ante and
ex post tax information and then explains their importance in facilitat-
ing observation and investigation, respectively. Part II then considers
the increasing importance of extraterritorial tax information and the
limits on countries' ability to gather that information unilaterally.45 Part
III describes the creation and the evolution of the market for extrater-
ritorial tax information over the course of the twentieth century.46 Part
IV considers the implications of two possible paths forward: (1) creat-
ing a more complete market, or (2) eliminating the need for a market
by creating a nonmarket supranational tax infrastructure or by reduc-
ing the consumption of extraterritorial tax information.
47
I. INFORMATION AND THE U.S. INCOME TAX
The U.S. income tax is a voracious consumer of information. 48 In
part, that is because there are few meaningful limits on the ability of tax
authorities to gather information, at least from within the United
States. 49 Perhaps the most important constraint is the willingness of tax
41 See infra notes 362-370 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 371-377 and accompanying text.
43 See infra notes 378-411 and accompanying text.
44 See infta notes 48-130 and accompanying text.
45 See infra notes 131-205 and accompanying text.
46 See infra notes 206-336 and accompanying text.
47 See infra notes 337-411 and accompanying text.
48 See Blum, supra note 25, at 623 (noting that the structure of the U.S. income tax re-
quires a variety of information disclosures to the IRS).
49 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6041-6042, 6111 (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (requiring various types
of third-party reporting); I.R.C. §§ 7601-7613 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007) (authorizing in-
vestigative and enforcement powers of IRS including summons and power to execute
search and arrest warrants, among others); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6011-1 (as amended in 1967),
[Vol. 49:605
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authorities to ask for it: in some situations, privacy" or other policy
concerns51 prevent authorities from demanding certain types of infor-
mation from or about taxpayers. Because they do not pay for the in-
formation they collect,52 the principal challenge for U.S. tax authorities
is engineering a system capable of gathering a vast amount of raw data
and extracting useful information from that data. 53
This Part considers the ways in which U.S. tax authorities collect
and use information. 54 The first Section illustrates the importance of
information by exploring its use in two contexts: the taxation of origi-
nal issue discount ("OID") and the federal government's ongoing bat-
tle against tax shelters.u5 In each case, the government relies on in-
formation provided by third parties about taxpayers' activities to
1.6012-1 (1960); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2T (2006) (requiring individual and corpo-
rate income tax returns); U.S. Dep't of Justice, Tax Division, About Us, http://www.
usdoj.gov/tax/about_us.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2008) [hereinafter DOJ, About Us] (de-
scribing federal criminal tax enforcement program).
50 The nontaxation of certain intrafamilial and other intimate "transactions" is at least
partly a function of the unwillingness of the IRS to ask the sorts of difficult questions that
might allow it to distinguish between those that should produce tax consequences and
those that should not. See United States v. Harris, 942 F.2d 1125, 1131-33 (7th Cir. 1991)
(addressing difficulty of characterizing transfers within intimate relationships when trans-
fers are neither purely motivated by generosity (and thus nontaxable) nor are simply com-
pensation for prostitution (clearly taxable)).
51 Unrealized appreciation, including capital gains, is not taxed each year and is instead
taxed when the appreciated property is sold or exchanged. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S.
189, 214-15 (1920) (concluding that "enrichment through increase in value of capital in-
vestment is not income"). Part of the rationale for refraining from taxing capital gains on a
mark-to-market basis (i.e., taxing each year's capital gains as they accrue) is the difficulty of
measuring gain or loss in the absence of a market transaction. See David J. Shakow, Taxation
Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1113-14 (1986)
(noting liquidity and valuation problems as most key arguments against "accrual" taxation).
But that argument is weakened when accurate asset pricing information is widely and
cheaply available. See id. at 1132-33 (noting that the information needed to impose current,
"accrual" taxation on income from publicly traded securities is readily available). For exam-
pie, refraining from taxing capital gains from publicly traded stock because of concerns
about access to pricing information would be unreasonable. See id.
52 See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE
GREAT DEBATE OVER TAX REFORM 134 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing the costs imposed on
private parties in complying with information reporting requirements).
53 The recent proposal to require third party reporting of taxpayers' "basis" in certain se-
curities illustrates the magnitude of the challenge. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION,
109-1 CONG., ADDITIONAL OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE 1-10 (Com. Print. 2006),
available at http://www.fmance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/20O5/prgIO1906.pdf. The proposal
is simple, but the complexity of the rules governing tax basis and the vast amount of data
involved could make the implementation extremely difficult. See id. at 9-10 (discussing chal-
lenges which would be involved in IRS administration of the proposal).
54 See infra notes 59-130 and accompanying text.
55 See infra notes 59-85 and accompanying text.
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supplement information reported by taxpayers themselves. 56 The fol-
lowing Section draws a distinction between observation and investiga-
tion, the two ways tax authorities use that information.5 7 Observation
uses ex ante information to identify possible wrongdoing, while inves-
tigation primarily relies on ex post information to serve as evidence of
wrongdoing. The third Section weighs the costs and benefits of ac-
quiring tax information. 58
A. Tax Information
The information that tax authorities need to keep the income tax
running smoothly defies easy categorization. Often that information
bears no resemblance to the universally recognizable, and easily verifi-
able, facts a typical individual might report on his or her tax return.
Along with information about salaries 59 received and cash dividends 60
paid, U.S. tax authorities receive a steady stream of updates regarding
more arcane items such as OID61 and "reportable transactions."62 In
some respects, these two streams of information are typical examples of
the information U.S. tax authorities receive. For instance, they pertain
to the activities of particular taxpayers and provide authorities with a
sort of "early warning system" for potential compliance failures. 63 At the
same time, they illustrate the idiosyncrasies that permeate U.S. tax
rules, and therefore, the idiosyncratic information needed to enforce
them.
1. OID Reporting
In a sense, idiosyncrasies are an unavoidable byproduct of the
sophistication of the U.S. income tax. Creating a system of rules that
attempts to ensure that tax liabilities reflect taxpayers' true economic
gains and losses represents an enormous challenge. Often, the diffi-
culty lies in reconciling nonprototypical transactions with a regime
designed with more conventional activity in mind. In a simple world
56 See infta notes 59-85 and accompanying text.
57 See infra notes 86-117 and accompanying text.
58 See infra notes 118-130 and accompanying text.
59 I.R.C. § 6041 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
- I.R.C. § 6042 (2000).
61 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-3 (as amended in 1996) (imposing reporting obliga-
tions on issuers of OD debt instruments).
62 See Treas. Reg. § 1.60114 (as amended in 2006) (defining "reportable transaction"
and describing reporting requirement).
6 See id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-3 (as amended in 1996).
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in which annual economic income and losses could be measured by
cash flows, enforcing an income tax would pose few challenges. When
transactions fail to fit neatly into that mold, the task becomes more
difficult, and tax rules can become complex. The OID rules, which
deem debt instruments with infrequent or irregular interest payment
schedules to pay interest at a steady annual rate, offer a relatively
straightforward example of this phenomenon. 64
The OID regime is complicated, but its purpose is simple.65 Most
taxpayers are only taxed on interest in the year that interest is paid.66
This system works fairly well when interest is paid steadily on a quarterly
or annual basis. Unfortunately, the concepts of debt and interest are
extremely flexible, so it is not difficult to create an unconventional
equivalent that provides lenders with identical economic returns but
with very different cash flows. 67
In essence, the OID rules require holders of debt instruments
with nonprototypical payment schedules to pay tax each year on the
basis of a series of hypothetical interest payments reflecting the
amount of economic income earned in each year.68 As a theoretical
matter, it is hard to find fault with this system. It poses obvious practi-
cal problems, however, for tax authorities. Keeping track of those hy-
pothetical payments is no small task even when transactions involve a
single borrower and a single lender. A challenging task becomes that
- See I.R.C. §§ 1271-1275 (2000).
6 See Diane M. Ring, One Nation Among Many: Policy Implications of Cross-Border Tax Arbi-
trage, 44 B.C. L. Rv. 79, 90-91 (2002) (noting that before the OID rules, taxpayers re-
ceived a significant deferral opportunity).
6 See I.R.C. § 451(a) (2000).
67 See United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54, 58 (1965) (noting that "$6
earned on a one-year note for $106 issued for $100 is precisely like the $6 earned on a one-
year loan of $100 at 6% stated interest" and concluding that both should receive the same
tax treatment). For example, a bank certificate of deposit ("CD") that provides for a single
payment to the purchaser/lender after five years can easily be structured to provide the
same economic yield as a loan with a similar term that provides for annual interest pay-
ments. Without the OID rules, the tax treatment of the two debt instruments would be
very different. See I.R.C. §§ 1271-1275; Ring, supra note 65, at 90-91 (discussing purpose
behind OD rules when first enacted in 1969). The lender receiving current interest pay-
ments would be taxed each year while the purchaser of the CD would only be required to
pay tax in the fifth year. See Ring, supra note 65, at 90-91. Without the OID rules, the re-
sulting tax deferral could represent a valuable tax benefit to the holder of the CD. See id.
Because many payors of interest, including banks that might issue such a CD, deduct in-
terest currently even when it is not paid currently, that deferral would often represent a
net loss to the government. See id.
- See I.R.C. § 1272.
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much more difficult when the debt instrument is a publicly traded
bond rather than a bank deposit.
To give tax authorities a way of monitoring taxpayers' voluntary
compliance with the OID rules, the issuers of OID instruments and cer-
tain intermediaries are required to submit a variety of contemporane-
ous reports to the government.69 Upon the issuance of the debt in-
strument, the borrower must provide the government with information
describing the characteristics of the debt instrument.70 In addition,
each year reports must be filed identifying each "recipient" of phantom
OLD income. 71 By matching the amounts of OID income reported by
taxpayers against the information provided by those third parties, tax
authorities can easily identify cases in which taxpayers have failed to
report the "receipt" of this hypothetical income. 72 Without access to
that contemporaneous information, tax authorities would only be able
to uncover OID underreporting through audits of particular taxpayers.
2. Tax Shelter Reporting
The OID reporting rules described above are only one of a num-
ber of interrelated, longstanding reporting regimes. 73 One relatively
new reporting requirement applies to transactions that exhibit charac-
teristics common to tax shelters.74 This new requirement attempts to
give tax authorities a means of identifying potential tax shelters among
the many ordinary transactions reported by taxpayers each year.75 For
tax authorities, identifying tax shelters among all of the ordinary trans-
actions is not quite like searching for a needle in a haystack, but there
69 I.R.C. § 6049 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007) (imposing reporting requirements on inter-
est payors and payees, including regarding OlD obligations); Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-3 (as
amended in 1996) (imposing reporting requirements on issuers of publicly traded OID
debt instruments).
70 Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-3.
71 I.R.C. § 6049(d) (6).
7 It should be noted that the amount of OED reported is often imprecise. See I.R.S.
Pub. No. 550, at 19 (2007). Because these debt instruments may generally be bought and
sold, the reporting regime may misidentify the recipient of the OLD or fail to take into
account relevant adjustments. See id. Taxpayers are required to make any necessary ad-
justments to the reported amounts. Id.
73 See I.R.C. § 6049. The modern third-party information-reporting regime was intro-
duced in 1917. War Revenue Act, Pub. L. No. 65-50, § 1211, 40 Stat. 300, 325 (1917).
74 Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b) (as amended in 2006) (identifying six categories of trans-
actions that must be reported as potential tax shelters). One of the six categories, transac-
tions with a significant book/tax disparity, was subsequently eliminated. LR.S. Notice 2006-
6, 2006-5 I.R.B. 385.
75 Raskolnikov, supra note 8, at 585-86.
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are similarities. 76 Tax authorities face long odds in discovering abusive
tax shelters using a "brute force" approach. The "reportable transac-
tion" requirements represent an effort to provide authorities with what
could be thought of as smart 77 information that allows them to target
transactions that are especially likely to be tax shelters.78
For example, the reportable transaction regulations initially re-
quired taxpayers and their advisors 79 to report any transaction in
which the book and the tax results differed significantly.8° This re-
quirement relied on the insight that taxpayers face different incen-
tives with respect to their accounting and tax results.8 1 Because man-
agers typically prefer to report optimistic results for book purposes
while understating their successes for tax purposes, significant gaps
between the two may indicate that managers are using tax shelters to
cut a business's tax liability.8 2 Another rule requires taxpayers to dis-
close their participation in transactions that are "confidential"83 as
potential tax shelters. Both approaches attempt to bolster the anti-tax-
shelter effort by providing tax authorities with information that is not
merely correct and complete but that is, above all else, useful.
Particularly when compared to the longstanding system for ex-
change of extraterritorial tax information, both the OLD reporting
76 See id.
77 In essence, tax authorities outsource some of their work to taxpayers. Rather than col-
lecting tax data and determining whether a transaction falls into one of the specified catego-
ries, taxpayers must instead conduct the necessary analysis. See Treas. Reg. § 1.60114(b).
78 See id.; Raskolniko; supra note 8, at 585-86.
79 The tax shelter rules require third parties classified as "material advisors" to alert au-
thorities to the existence of reportable transactions. See I.R.C. § 6111 (Supp. V 2005).
80 Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b) (6). Eventually, that reporting requirement was subsumed
into the broader annual Schedule M-3 reporting requirement. SeeJohn Keenan et al., Tax
Shelters-Reportable Transaction Disclosure Regulations Continue to Evolve, 59 Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA) No. 59, at I (Mar. 28, 2007); supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
81 See David I. Walker, Financial Accounting and Corporate Behavior, 64 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 927, 972, 990 (2007) (noting managers may face incentives to inflate income for ac-
counting purposes even at the cost of increasing the firm's tax bill).
82 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SIIELTERS: Dis-
CUSSION, ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 14 (1999), available at http://www.treas.
gov/offices/tax-policy/library/ctswhite.pdf. This intuition that a growing book-tax gap indi-
cates expansion of tax shelters has come under attack over the past few years. See Daniel
Shaviro, The Optimal Relationship Between Taxable Income and Financial Accounting Income: Analy-
sis and a Proposal 3 & n.3 (N.Y Univ. Sch. of Law, NYU Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., Law &
Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 07-38, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 1017073 (noting disagreement over the exact causes of the book-tax gap).
83 Treas. Reg. § 1.60114(b) (3) (as amended in 2006).
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rules and the reportable transaction requirements are relatively new. 84
They each were created in response to specific needs and carefully
designed to ensure that the information they generated would be re-
sponsive to those needs.85 As a result, they constitute more than sim-
ple compilations of readily available information. Thus, they illustrate
the specificity of the information needed to ensure compliance with a
complex income tax system.
B. Observation and Investigation
The reporting requirements described above illustrate two key fea-
tures of the system U.S. tax authorities use to gather information about
taxpayers. First, it requires third parties to generate and report a sig-
nificant amount of information regarding taxpayers and their activi-
ties.86 Second, it often requires that information be reported automati-
cally and contemporaneously with the payments or the transaction
triggering the reporting obligation. 87
Although important, those ex ante information reporting re-
quirements are not the only method tax authorities employ to monitor
taxpayers. This Section draws a distinction between the two principal
techniques tax authorities employ to ensure taxpayer compliance: ob-
servation and investigation.8 8 The two information acquisition tech-
niques described above illustrate the power of observation, which al-
lows tax authorities to identify potential compliance failures among a
large number of transactions and taxpayers. Observation relies on ex
ante information reporting requirements to make it possible for au-
thorities to spot noncompliance without taking any affirmative meas-
ures to collect information about specific taxpayers or their activities.
89
84 Compare 1927 Report, supra note 16, at 22-23 (containing early tax information ex-
change provisions), with I.R.C. § 6049 (West Supp. 2007), and Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-3 (as amended in 1996) (imposing reporting obligations on
issuers of OLD debt instruments); Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b).
8 Both the OlD and tax shelter rules discussed above rely heavily on third-party re-
porting. See I.R.C. § 6049; I.R.C. § 6111 (Supp. V 2005); Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b).
8- See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6049.
8 See infra notes 89-117 and accompanying text.
8 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b) (2) to -4(b) (7).
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Investigation plays a different role.90 While ex ante information
acquisition techniques provide authorities with a great breadth of in-
formation, they are no substitute for ex post information acquisition
techniques. By focusing on a specific taxpayer or transaction, perhaps
identified as potentially aberrant through observation, tax authorities
can use their investigatory powers to assemble a picture of a taxpayer's
behavior with the depth necessary to prove and, if necessary, prosecute
taxpayer noncompliance.9 '
1. Ex Ante Information Reporting Requirements
U.S. tax authorities require a wide range of individuals and enti-
ties to report an array of payments, transactions, and events. 92 In the
first instance, individuals, corporations, estates, and others are obli-
gated to file tax returns describing their own status and activities each
year.9 3 In addition, third parties doing business with or providing ser-
vices to those taxpayers are required to provide information that is
used to supplement and verify that self-reported information.9 4
Information reporting regimes similar to the OID rules described
above apply to a range of more common income items, including
wages 95 and dividends.96 As a result, the information that employees
and investors receive on the familiar Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
Forms W-2 and 1099 provided by employers and financial institutions
90 The relationship between ex ante and ex post information is not precisely the same
as that between observation and investigation. Authorities may choose to use ex post in-
formation, information collected after an event or transaction has taken place, simply to
check on taxpayers' compliance. Alternatively, authorities may find information they col-
lect automatically and contemporaneously to be useful during the course of an investiga-
tion. Nevertheless, as a general matter, ex ante information is best suited to observation
whereas ex post information lends itself to investigation.
o1 See I.R.C. §§ 7601-7613 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007) (authorizing investigative and en-
forcement powers of IRS including summons and power to execute search and arrest war-
rants, among others); DOJ, About Us, supra note 49 (describing federal criminal tax en-
forcement program).
92 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6041-6042, 6111 (2000 & Supp. V 2005); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6011-1
(as amended in 1967), 1.6012-1 (1960); Temp Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2T (2006) (requiring
individual and corporate income tax returns).
93 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6011-1, 1.6012-1; Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2T (requiring
individual and corporate income tax returns).
9 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6041-6042, 6111; Lederman, supra note 7, at 697-99.
- I.R.C. § 6041.
- I.R.C. § 6042.
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every year is also reported directly to tax authorities. 97 Because that in-
formation is reported along with taxpayers' social security numbers (or
taxpayer identification numbers ("TINs")), it would be a relatively sim-
ple matter for the government to determine the tax liability for many
individual taxpayers even if no return is filed. 98
Observation serves two interrelated purposes: (1) affirmatively dis-
couraging noncompliance by (2) allowing authorities to identify non-
compliance. 99 When third-party information capable of verifying that
reported by taxpayers is not available from employers, financial institu-
tions, or other intermediaries, self-reporting becomes far less reli-
able.'00 On the one hand, if taxpayers believe that the government has
been notified that they have received payments that almost certainly
represent items of taxable income, taxpayers have little to gain by fail-
ing to report those amounts.10' On the other hand, a taxpayer confi-
dent that the government has no way of knowing that she has received
income may only have her conscience to contend with if she fails to re-
port it.102 As a result, by encouraging compliance, ex ante information
97 See I.R.C. §§ 6041-6042; I.R.S. Form W-2, Wage & Tax Statement (2008), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/fw2.pdf; I.R.S. General Instructions for Forms 1099, 1098,
5498 & W-2G, at 8 (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1099gi.pdf.
98 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6039G, 60501, 6050L, 6050P (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (requiring dis-
closure of TINs as a component of reporting particular transactions). California has actu-
ally begun limited use of a "ReadyReturn" that uses information provided by employers to
prepare a completed tax return that taxpayers can simply review and approve over the
internet. See State of Cal. Franchise Tax Bd., Frequently Asked Questions About ReadyRe-
turn, http://www.ftb.ca.gov/readyReturn/faq-about.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
9 The same basic principle, using visibility to ensure voluntary compliance, applies to
information reporting and to Foucault's panopticon. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND
PUNISH 201-02 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977) (describing use
of surveillance that is at once "[v]isible" and "[u]nverifiable" to ensure that "it is not nec-
essary to use force to constrain the convict to good behaviour, the madman to calm, the
worker to work, the schoolboy to application, the patient to the observation of the regula-
tions"). Likewise, when taxpayers are aware that certain types of income are subject to
third-party information reporting there is generally no need for tax authorities to enforce
compliance.
100 See Lederman, supra note 7, 698 & n.13 (noting that income reporting compliance
falls from above ninety percent to below fifty percent when third-party information report-
ing is unavailable).
101 See id. Wages paid by a domestic employer are the quintessential example of such
payments. See id. The successful prosecution of Richard Hatch for tax evasion for failing to
report his one million dollar "Survivor" prize provides a colorful illustration of the futility
of failing to report income that will come to the government's attention through other
channels. See Pam Belluck, A New Reality for First "Survivor" Winner: Tax Evasion TriaL, N.Y.
TuIES, Jan. 22, 2006, at 16; "Survivor" Hatch Guilty of Tax Evasion, CBSNEWS.coM, Jan. 25,
2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/01/25/entertainment/main1237996.shtml.
102 See Raskolnikov; supra note 8, at 578 (discussing potential influence of cultural tra-
ditions and social norms on taxpayer compliance). The classic case in which taxpayers
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reporting requirements not only help authorities to correct taxpayer
omissions but also limit the need to make such corrections. 03
2. Ex Post Information Acquisition
If sufficiently comprehensive, observation could virtually elimi-
nate noncompliance. 10 4 Unfortunately, despite tax authorities' best
efforts, both garden-variety underreporting and tax fraud remain sig-
nificant problems.10 5 To pursue suspected tax cheats, tax authorities
rely on different sorts of information gathering techniques than they
use to observe taxpayers. 06 Rather than attempting to anticipate the
information they need to monitor compliance, tax authorities collect
information on an as-needed basis; they determine the source and the
nature of the information required in each circumstance. 10 7 Some of
those investigative techniques, such as the use of grand juries and
search warrants, are no different than those employed in other con-
texts.108 Others, like the IRS's power to compel the production of in-
formation by issuing an administrative summons, are more unique. 0 9
Pursuant to its administrative summons power, the IRS has broad
authority to investigate potential wrongdoing by collecting information
with respect to the activities of a particular taxpayer.110 This power al-
lows the IRS great latitude to engage in "fishing expeditions" based on
discovered a large amount of cash in a used piano provides an example of a situation in
which authorities have no way to verify self-reported amounts. See Cesarini v. United States,
296 F. Supp. 3, 4 (N.D. Ohio 1969). In practice, income earned by small, cash-based busi-
nesses is prone to this kind of underreporting. See Lederman, supra note 7, at 698 n.12;
Raskolnikov, supra note 8, at 575.
103 See Lederman, supra note 7, at 698 n.12.
104 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 52, at 160-61 (noting that the IRS must monitor
and investigate taxpayers whose incomes are not subject to information reporting, and
that tax enforcement becomes easier where withholding and information reporting are
available); Lederman, supa note 7, at 698 (noting increased compliance in areas with
third-party reporting compared with areas in which third-party information reporting is
not available).
1o See Sawicky, supra note 6, at 6 (estimating components of the tax gap).
106 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 7601-7613 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007) (authorizing investigative
and enforcement powers of IRS including summons and power to execute search and
arrest warrants, among others).
107 See id.
108 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7608 (authorizing internal revenue officers to execute and serve
search warrants and arrest warrants).
109 See I.R.C. § 7602(a).
110 See id.
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nothing more than a suspicion that the law may have been violated."'
The IRS has the power to issue a summons either to the taxpayer that is
the subject of the inquiry or to a third party in possession of informa-
tion about the taxpayer."12
The only significant limit on the IRS's summons power applies
when the investigation changes from an administrative inquiry to a
criminal prosecution. 113 When the IRS refers a case to the Justice De-
partment for prosecution, the IRS loses the power to issue an adminis-
trative summons.114 After a referral, the Justice Department may con-
tinue to investigate broadly but must do so through a grand jury. 1 5 Of
course, the prosecutors of tax crimes, including attorneys from the
Criminal Enforcement Sections of the Justice Department's Tax Division
and Assistant U.S. Attorneys, 1 6 have all the powers ordinarily wielded in
criminal cases.
The government's capacity to gather ex post information is un-
doubtedly an important complement to the ex ante information re-
porting regime. The power to investigate, however, is no substitute for
the power to observe." 7 Together, they provide tax authorities with a
powerful combination of depth and breadth of information that al-
lows them both to discourage and punish noncompliance.
C. Balancing Benefits and Costs ofAcquiring Tax Information
The compliance and enforcement benefits of providing tax au-
thorities with access to ex post and, in particular, ex ante1 18 tax infor-
mation are obvious. The costs of providing authorities with that access
"I United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 641-43 (1950); accord United States
v. Luther, 481 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1973) ("Sec. 7602 authorizes the Secretary or his
delegate 'to fish.'").
i11 The IRS must generally notify the subject of the investigation that it may issue third-
party summonses and must also notify taxpayers within three days after the issuance of a
third-party summons. See I.R.C. §§ 7602(c), 7609(a).
113 See I.R.C. § 7602(d).
114 See id.
115 See id.; see also Aorton Salt, 338 U.S. at 642 (likening the administrative summons
power to a grand jury's broad investigative authority).
116 See DOJ, About Us, supra note 49 (describing federal criminal tax enforcement pro-
gram).
117 See Lederman, supra note 7, at 697-98. Importantly, technology allows authorities to
leverage their observational capacity by collecting and analyzing ever greater amounts of
information. See OECD MANUAL, supra note 24, at 8 (allowing for as many as 104 items of
information about each taxpayer in standard OECD electronic information exchange
format). Investigation lends itself less well to automation.
118 Because it encourages greater compliance and provides authorities with a low-cost
means of spotting noncompliance, ex ante information is especially important.
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tend to be less apparent. 19 In part, that is because the duty to supply
tax information is imposed on an extremely broad class of individuals
and entities, and the costs of supplying that information are dispersed
even more broadly. 20 That said, the costs of supplying tax information
to the government are not insignificant. 12 1
In the domestic context, it would not be entirely unreasonable to
assume that the amount of information that is acquired by tax authori-
ties produces benefits that are comparable to the costs they impose. 122
A smoothly functioning political process would tend to create that
rough parity.123 If the public perceived the costs of information report-
ing to be higher than its benefits, government actors would have an
incentive to reduce those costs by limiting the amount of information
119 The IRS budget is also much easier to quantify than the costs taxpayers and other
third parties incur. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 52, at 136 (noting the difficulty of
estimating business tax compliance costs).
120 See id. at 134 (noting that the total compliance costs paid by taxpayers and third
parties dwarf the IRS's budget). Because nearly all employers are required to report the
amount of wages paid, see I.R.C. § 6041 (2000 & Supp. V 2005), the incidence of the costs
of information reporting are likely to be passed on to customers in the form of higher
prices or to employees in the form of lower wages. By contrast, if information reporting
costs were borne by some businesses but not by their competitors, it would be more diffi-
cult to shift those costs onto another party by raising prices or lowering wages.
121 Compliance costs are an important component of the enormous expenses involved
in making the income tax function. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 52, at 134-38 (esti-
mating that the total annual cost of enforcing and complying with federal income taxes in
1999 was approximately $1 billion).
122 In practice, it is far from obvious that the political process will produce an optimal
amount of information. If the incidence of information reporting costs fell on a relatively
small but powerful group while creating benefits for the general public, public choice
theory would suggest that the political process would tend to produce too little informa-
tion reporting. See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legis-
lative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1990)
(explaining public choice view that narrow, organized interests tend to benefit at the ex-
pense of more diffuse interests). Nevertheless, despite whatever flaws the system may ex-
hibit, a mechanism that can constrain authorities' impulses to demand either too much or
too little taxpayer information does exist through the electoral process. See id.
123 In this sense, tax information is a public good. As is true of all public goods, ensur-
ing the production of an appropriate amount of tax information requires affirmative gov-
ernment intervention. In theory, private actors could act collectively to acquire informa-
tion about OID or tax shelters and provide that information to tax authorities. Because
everyone derives some measure of benefit from the roads, police protection, national de-
fense, and other services that government provides by way of its tax revenue, everyone has
an interest in ensuring that the government is able to collect the taxes it imposes. In real-
ity, coordination problems would make such collective action impossible. Determining
how much each person should contribute to the collection effort would be difficult. Ensur-
ing that each beneficiary actually makes a contribution (or, conversely, preventing would-
be free-riders from receiving benefits) would be impossible.
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they acquire. 124 On the other hand, if the public had an appetite for
more information reporting and were willing to bear the resulting
costs, tax authorities' access to information would be increased. 125
One could argue that the success of a government's tax informa-
tion acquisition efforts is simply a function of how much useful infor-
mation it produces. After all, if the purpose of collecting information
about taxpayers and their activities is to promote compliance, perhaps
nothing but its effect on compliance should matter.126 By this measure,
a good system would produce large amounts of information and high
levels of compliance and a poor system would not. hi practice, ignoring
the costs of acquiring tax information would amount to prioritizing tax
compliance over other socially valuable government activities and pri-
-*ate interests. An additional dollar spent by tax authorities on acquiring
tax information could, for example, mean less money available for na-
tional defense. 127 On the other hand, if tax authorities could secure the
same amount of tax information and compliance at a cost to private
parties of either one dollar or five dollars, choosing the cheaper ap-
proach could increase social welfare by four dollars.
Within a single jurisdiction, the design of the tax information ac-
quisition infrastructure will at least theoretically be a product of a co-
herent political process. Because tax authorities ultimately answer to
elected officials, there is a political incentive to strike an appropriate
balance between ensuring that adequate tax information is collected
and curbing the use of ex ante or ex post tools that impose excessive or
124 For example, in 1995, the IRS ended the practice of "general audits" of taxpayers
pursuant to Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program ("TCMP") "under pressure from
Congress and taxpayer groups among others." Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in
Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 790, 807 (2007).
125 Recently, the IRS introduced a successor to the TCMP. Id. at 807 n.104. This action
could indicate a resurgence of popular support for information acquisition by tax authori-
ties despite its significant cost to taxpayers. Nevertheless, this new program "ha[s] incurred
the ire of taxpayers and lawmakers alike." Herman P. Ayayo, Depth ofIRS National Compli-
once Study Questioned, 102 TAX NoTEs 716, 716 (2004).
126 hi theory, information collected for tax purposes could be used for a host of other
government purposes. The circumstances in which taxpayers' information may be used,
however, are strictly limited by statute. See I.R.C. § 6103 (West Supp. IV 2008) (as amended
by Pub. L. No. 110-172, 121 Stat. 2476 (2007); Pub. L. No. 110-142, 121 Stat. 1803, 1807
(2007)) (generally prohibiting the disclosure of tax "returns and return information" ex-
cept in specific enumerated situations).
127 If an additional dollar spent on tax information acquisition would generate $1.01
in additional tax revenues, this would obviously not be true: the additional information-
gathering would pay for itself.
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inequitably distributed costs. 128 Likewise, the possibility of voter back-
lash would prevent authorities from acquiring information taxpayers
would prefer to keep out of government hands. 2 9
The same is not true, however, in the cross-border context. With-
out either a robust market 130 or effective supranational government
intervention, governments may acquire far too much extraterritorial
tax information or far too little. Because such a market does not exist
and no government actor has the power to successfully intervene, na-
tional governments have been unable to acquire the extraterritorial tax
information they need in the global economy to effectively enforce
their tax laws.
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL TAX INFORMATION
Extraterritorial tax information is far more important in 2008 than
it was in 1927.131 Unfortunately, although globalization has transformed
the way taxpayers earn their income, there has been no comparable
evolution of the tools tax authorities use to gather information. 3 2 This
Part examines the magnitude and implications of the mismatch be-
tween private actors' freedom to ignore national borders and the con-
straints tax authorities face when they attempt to enforce tax laws in a
globalized world. 33 The first Section provides two examples of why ex-
traterritorial tax information has become increasingly important to
U.S. tax authorities. 13 4 The next Section considers the unilateral tools
128 But see Brown, supra note 124, at 807-08 & n.105 (discussing disproportionate au-
dits of low-income taxpayers). A cynic might conclude that the especially vigorous en-
forcement efforts directed at low-income taxpayers is a product of their lack of political
influence.
129 See Blum, supra note 25, at 614-15 (noting congressional compromise allowing the
IRS to gather information necessary to enforce the income tax but enacting restrictions on
the use of information after its disclosure to the government).
120 Such a market would provide a mechanism of matching the costs of supplying in-
formation with the benefits of receiving it. That market could serve the same purpose
among jurisdictions as the internal political process does within a single jurisdiction.
131 See Steven V. Melnik, Corporate Expatriations-The Tip of the Iceberg: Restoring the Com-
petitiveness of the United States in the Global Marketplace, 8 N.YU.J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 81,
92-95 (2004) (noting the current global nature of the economy compared with the far
more limited international economy at the time the United States adopted its interna-
tional tax system).
132 See Joann M. Weiner, OECD, IRS Officials Discuss Exchange of Information, 117 TAX
NOTES 135, 135 (2007) (noting tax officials' observations that the "increasing flow of cross-
border income and investment is placing increased pressure on countries to improve the
exchange of information among tax authorities").
1ss See infra notes 138-205 and accompanying text.
134 See infra notes 138-167 and accompanying text.
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U.S. tax authorities employ to gather tax information in the cross-
border context. 135 Although they are essentially the same as those used
effectively within the United States, they have a much more limited ex-
traterritorial reach.1 36 The last Section imagines what sort of informa-
tion might be on U.S. tax authorities' extraterritorial tax information
wish lists and explains why no two countries are likely to have lists that
are exactly the same.137
A. The Growing Importance of Extraterritorial Tax Information
The first phenomenon used to illustrate the importance of extra-
territorial tax information for the United States, known as expatriation,
involves the tax-motivated abandonment of U.S. citizenship or perma-
nent resident status.1 38 The second, tax flight, occurs when U.S. citizens
or residents open overseas accounts or form foreign entities to disguise
their income in order to hide it from U.S. tax authorities.1 39 Both serve
as examples of compliance failures that for decades have been the fo-
cus of consistent, but unsatisfying, enforcement countermeasures.140
They also both represent instances in which tax authorities could bene-
fit enormously from access to ex ante extraterritorial tax information
on par with the domestic ex ante information they receive with respect
to OLD and reportable transactions, but instead depend almost entirely
on ex post investigative information. In the domestic context, a more
balanced approach, involving both ex ante and ex post information,
has evolved to address such problems. In the global context, unfortu-
nately, U.S. tax authorities simply have very limited access to useful ex
ante extraterritorial tax information.
135 See infra notes 168-195 and accompanying text.
136 See infra notes 168-195 and accompanying text.
137 See infra notes 196-205 and accompanying text.
138 See I.R.C. § 877 (2000 & Supp. V 2005); H.R. REP. 108-548, at 253 (2004).
139 See 1998 OECD REPORT, supra note 18, at 21-24; Dean, supra note 35, at 924-25.
140 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b) (as amended in 2006) (requiring reporting of po-
tential tax shelter transactions); 1998 OECD REPORT, supra note 18, at 38-71 (making rec-
ommendations to counteract harmful tax competition, including tax havens); ORG. FOR
ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL CONVENTION FOR MUTUAL
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN THE RECOVERY OF TAX CLAIMS 11 (1981) [hereinafter
OECD 1981 MODEL CONVENTION].
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1. Expatriation
The reach, or perhaps more realistically, the purported reach, of
the U.S. income tax is extremely broad.14' A variety of statutory provi-
sions 142 and bilateral treaties 143 establish limits on the situations in
which the United States will attempt to tax the foreign income of U.S.
residents and citizens. If none of those special exceptions apply, how-
ever, the income earned by any individual born in the United States will
be taxed by the United States, even decades after he relocates to a for-
eign country and even if the income has no actual connection to the
United States.144 For example, a person. living in Chile and receiving a
dividend from a Russian corporation would be subject to normal U.S.
tax on the dividend income. 145
An entirely different set of rules applies to nonresident nonciti-
zens. 146 For these individuals, only income with a specific connection to
the United States is subject to U.S. tax.1 47 As a result, dividend income
earned by a citizen of the Bahamas would be subject to U.S. tax if the
dividend is paid by a U.S. corporation' 48 but not if it were paid by a
Russian corporation. 49 Because of the sharp divide the United States
creates between its citizens and others, the tax advantages of being a
Bahamian citizen rather than a U.S. citizen can be substantial. 150
To limit potential revenue losses attributable to, and also in re-
sponse to the perceived unfairness of, wealthy individuals escaping the
income tax by exchanging their U.S. passports for foreign passports,
the United States created a special tax regime targeting the pre-
141 See Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 54-56 (1924) (concluding that income of U.S. citizens,
even in the absence of any connection between the income and the United States, is sub-
ject to the U.S. income tax); Michael S. Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax Law:
Symbols, Shaming, and Social Norm Management as a Substitute for Effective Tax Policy, 89 IOWA
L. REv. 863, 870 (2004).
142 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 911 (West Supp. TV 2008) (amended by Pub. L. No. 110-172, 121
Stat. 2476 (2007)) (allowing U.S. citizens to earn a certain amount and type of income
without being subject to U.S. tax); I.R.C. §§ 901, 903-905 (West Supp. IV 2008) (amended
by Pub. L. No. 110-172, 121 Stat. 2489-90 (2007)) (allowing tax credit for foreign taxes
paid on certain foreign income).
143 See, e.g., U.S. 2006 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 23.
144 See Cook, 265 U.S. at 56.
145 See I.R.C. § 61 (2000); Cook, 265 U.S. at 56.
146 See Kirsch, supra note 141, at 870-73.
147 See id. at 870-71.
148 See I.R.C. § 861 (a) (2) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (treating dividends paid by U.S. cor-
porations as "income from sources within the United States" stbject to U.S. tax).
149 See I.R.C. § 862(a) (2) (2000) (treating dividends paid by foreign corporations as
"income from sources without the United States" not subject to U.S. tax).
150 See Kirsch, supra note 141, at 873.
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expatriation gains of those individuals. 15' That regime subjects former
U.S. citizens and residents to a kind of alternative minimum tax de-
signed to negate the tax benefits of expatriating.1 52 Rather than being
subject to the potentially more favorable rules generally available to
nonresident aliens, persons subject to those rules will pay the higher of
the tax applicable to nonresident aliens and a modified version of the
tax paid by U.S. residents. 153
hi theory, because they eliminate key tax benefits of expatriation,
these antiexpatriation rules should be quite effective. In recent years,
clear rules have increasingly replaced broad standards in an attempt to
facilitate improved enforcement. 54 In practice, it is difficult to say
whether these measures have much bite. To enforce section 877 of the
Internal Revenue Code, tax authorities must have some way of monitor-
ing taxpayers' postexpatriation voluntary compliance. 55 Because expa-
triation necessarily involves cutting ties to the United States, U.S. tax
authorities will have limited ex post information about those postexpa-
triation activities subject to the alternative tax regime. 56 They will have
virtually no access to third-party ex ante information about that income.
2. Tax Havens (Tax Flight)
For those individuals unwilling or unable to sever their real-world
ties to the United States, the existence of offshore tax havens provides
a form of "virtual" expatriation: tax flight. Rather than changing their
own tax status, U.S. individuals willing to break the law can create off-
shore accounts or entities to produce the illusion that their invest-
151 See I.R.C. § 877 (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (imposing a broadened "alternative tax" on
expatriates); H.R. RE,. No. 108-755, at 581-92 (2004) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 2004
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1341, 1647-58.
152 See I.R.C. § 877; H.R. REP. No. 108-755, at 582-92.
153 See I.R.C. § 877(b).
154 See H.R. REP. No. 108-755, at 582-83; Kirsch, supra note 141, at 885-87 (describing
1996 statutory amendments intended to replace relatively subjective standards with more
"objective" rules). More recent statutory amendments shifted the balance even more
strongly in favor of rules by eliminating the requirement that the expatriation be tax moti-
vated. H.R. REP. No. 108-548, at 253 (2004).
155 Tax authorities are theoretically required to monitor sales of foreign stock by non-
resident alien individuals. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 877(d) (1) (C) (expanding U.S. taxation of in-
come derived by expatriates from sales of stock in certain foreign corporations by treating
those gains as a U.S. source).
156 The Internal Revenue Code does require self-reporting from individual taxpayers
subject to the alternative tax. I.R.C. §§ 877(b), 6039G (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
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ments, including their U.S. investments, belong to foreign persons. 157
The existence of those accounts or entities has no effect on their
owners' legal obligations to pay U.S. income tax.'58 If the illusion is
successful, however, and if the associated income is not voluntarily
reported, U.S. tax authorities will have no opportunity to pursue a
claim for unpaid taxes. 159
In recent years, tax flight has received a great deal of attention.1 60
Both international organizations such as the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") and individual gov-
ernments have devoted time and resources to studying the prob-
lem.161 Despite those official efforts and a consensus that the solution
to the tax flight problem is greater access to extraterritorial tax in-
formation, 162 estimates of annual revenue losses suggest that tax flight
($50 billion) 163 may still be a bigger problem than false earned in-
come tax credit claims ($9 billion) and corporate underreporting
($30 billion, including $10 billion to $15 billion in tax shelters) com-
bined. 64 Even tax havens' publicly stated intentions to combat tax
flight have been slow to produce much in the way of actual change. 65
157 In the case of one Cayman bank under investigation by the Department of Justice,
there was virtually nothing foreign about the bank or its activities. Joseph Guttentag &
Reuven Avi-Yonah, Closing the International Tax Gap, in BRIDGING THE TAX GAP: ADDRESS-
ING THE CRISIS IN FEDERAL TAX ADMINISTRATION 99, 99-100 (Max B. Sawicky ed., 2005)
('[B]oth the underlying funds ... and the investment income, were generally purely
[U.S.] domestic transactions...
158 See Weiner, supra note 132, at 135.
159 See Guttentag & Avi-Yonah, supra note 157, at 100.
160 See, e.g., 1998 OECD REPORT, supra note 18, at 7-18 (identifying the existence of tax
havens as a major threat to global welfare); Weiner, supra note 132, at 135; Bruce Zagaris,
The Procedural Aspects of U.S. Tax Policy Towards Developing Countries: Too Many Sticks and No
Carrots?, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 331, 332-33 (2003) (describing recent U.S. efforts to
reinvigorate its Tax Information Exchange Agreement program).
161 See, e.g., 1998 OECD REPORT, supra note 18, at 7-18, 20-22; Zagaris, supra note 160,
at 332-33.
162 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the IWel-
fare State, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1573, 1667-76 (2000) (proposing the creation of an informa-
tion reporting/withholding tax regime by developed countries to combat tax flight by
increasing access to extraterritorial tax information); Dean, supra note 35, at 957-60 (pro-
posing tax flight treaties that provide greater access to extraterritorial tax information);
Guttentag & Avi-Yonah, supra note 157, at 105-06.
163 Guttentag & Avi-Yonah, supra note 157, at 101.
164 Sawicky, supra note 6, at 4-6.
165 Maria Flavia Ambrosanio & Maria Serena Caroppo, Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices
in Tax Havens: Defensive Measures by Major EU Countries and Tax Haven Reforms, 53 CAN. TAX
J. 685, 710 (2005) (noting that most tax havens that "announced programs of reform ...
have not yet put their formal commitments into practice").
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The heart of the problem lies in the vast gulf between the informa-
tion to which tax authorities have access domestically and the informa-
tion they are able to collect abroad. 166 That gap is so large that the in-
cremental gains achieved by these anti-tax-flight efforts still leave tax
authorities with far less access to ex post and especially to ex ante tax
information than they rely on domestically.167
B. Limits of UnilateralExtraterritorial Tax Information Acquisition
When U.S. tax authorities face a domestic enforcement problem
comparable to international issues like tax flight or expatriation, they
may not always succeed in bringing taxpayers to heel, but at the very
least they have the capacity to acquire the information they need to at-
tempt enforcement. 168 By contrast, the threshold issue in the campaign
to eliminate tax flight is access to information about taxpayers' invest-
ments. 169 In a sense, the same is true with respect to expatriations. 170
Although both tax flight and expatriations represent troubling vulner-
abilities in the U.S. income tax, each is also a symptom of the broader
threat to the integrity of national tax systems posed by the inability of
tax authorities to gain access to extraterritorial tax information in an
increasingly globalized world.171 Even when taxpayers do not go to such
extraordinary lengths to avoid taxes, the inability of tax authorities to
observe and investigate their extraterritorial activities can give taxpay-
ers the tipper hand.172
166 See Tillinghast, supra note 8, at 39 (noting that in the international context "a large
part of the information the IRS needs is not directly available to it"); id. at 51 (noting
power of third-party summons but that it is only available when the third party falls under
U.S. courts'jurisdiction).
167 See generally id. For example, even if tax havens were to report every dollar of cash
interest paid to U.S. citizens, U.S. tax authorities would still be left without access to annual
OID information. Under those circumstances, taxpayers could effectively choose whether
or not to be subject to current taxation by choosing whethei to receive current cash inter-
est payments. An investigation of a particular taxpayer would be the only way for tax au-
thorities to identify and correct resulting compliance failures.
168 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 7601-7613 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007) (authorizing investigative
and enforcement powers of the IRS including summons and power to execute search and
arrest warrants, among others).
169 See 1998 OECD REPORT, supra note 18, at 7-18 (identifying the existence of tax ha-
vens as a major threat to global welfare); Zagaris, supra note 160, at 332-33 (describing
recent U.S. efforts to reinvigorate its Tax Information Exchange Agreement program).
170 Without access to information with respect to expatriate taxpayers' foreign invest-
ment income, authorities have no way of monitoring compliance with its special alterna-
tive tax regime.
171 See Tillinghast, supra note 8, at 39-43, 49-57.
172 See id.
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As described below, one aspect of the information gap results from
the weakness of U.S. tax authorities' foreign investigative powers.1 73
Even more significant, however, is the increasingly stark contrast be-
tween the ability of tax authorities to acquire ex ante information do-
mestically and their much more limited ability to collect the same in-
formation globally. Because their investigative powers were crafted to
work in tandem with, rather than as a substitute for, observation, even
when tax authorities are able to achieve some success in their foreign
investigations, levels of compliance are likely to remain much lower
with respect to extraterritorial income than the), are domestically. 174
1. Extraterritorial Ex Ante Information Reporting
Because U.S. tax rules apply to foreign income in much the same
way as they apply to income generally, ex ante information reporting is
just as important with respect to extraterritorial tax information as it is
domestically.175 For instance, OlD income earned by a U.S. citizen or
resident is generally subject to U.S. tax, whether it is earned with re-
spect to a debt instrument issued by a corporation headquartered in
Ohio or in Japan. 176 In an ideal world, U.S. tax authorities could count
on receiving the same information with respect to the Japanese OID as
they would for a domestic instrument.
Unfortunately, in practice it is much more difficult to acquire in-
formation about the foreign debt instrument. First, although U.S. tax
authorities can compel domestic issuers and intermediaries to provide
them with whatever information they deem appropriate, their Japanese
counterparts will often be out of reach. 77 One explanation for that re-
stilt lies in the jurisdictional boundaries and conflicts that limit coun-
tries' ability to exercise authority outside their borders. 178 A second fac-
173 See id.
174 See Lederman, supra note 7, at 698.
175 See Cook, 265 U.S. at 54-56 (concluding that income of U.S. citizens, even in the ab-
sence of any connection between the income and the United States, is subject to the U.S.
income tax).
176 See id.
177 See I.R.C. § 6049(b) (2) (C) (iii) (West SUpp. 2007) (exempting interest paid by for-
eign corporations not engaged in a U.S. trade or business from the interest reporting re-
quirements unless specified by regulations).
178 See Tillinghast, supra note 8, at 39. Tillinghast notes that although the IRS 'consid-
ers any foreign person making payments of U.S.-source income to be a statutory withhold-
ing agent. It has no practical way to enforce this obligation .... " Id. He also observes that
"[i]f the payment is something other than U.S. source income subject to U.S. withholding
tax, the IRS has no basis for requiring compliance." Id.
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tor, unique to the tax context, is the very different question of whether
a foreign corporation not doing business in the United States would
even have the capacity to provide the specific information sought by
U.S tax authorities. For a foreign corporation to report OID it would be
required both to (1) apply reliably the elusive U.S. distinction between
debt and equity179 and (2) master the complex U.S. OID regime.1s
Because each country's tax regime evolves in response to a range of
unique factors,' 8' foreign actors unfamiliar with U.S. tax rules may not be
in a position to generate the information sought by U.S. tax authorities.
For example, ifJapan chose not to tax OID, or did so according to a sig-
nificantly different regime, 8 2 even if U.S. authorities overcame the juris-
dictional impediments to imposing reporting requirements on Japanese
borrowers, the amount of "interest" reported by such a borrower as paid
to a U.S. lender might be useless to U.S. tax authorities. 18 Of course not
every type of income implicates rules as singular as those that govern the
debt/equity distinction and OID. Still, even relatively subtle differences
between countries' tax systems represent a significant obstacle to acquir-
ing useful ex ante extraterritorial tax information. 84
Even at the most basic level, those incompatibilities can pose real
problems for tax authorities. The best example of this is the mecha-
nism tax authorities use to match information reported by third parties
with a particular taxpayer. 1' Domestically, tax authorities are able to
rely on TINs to accomplish the task. 1' In the cross-border context, be-
cause TINs.vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, 8 7 even when extrater-
179 See generally William T. Plumb, The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A
Critical Analysis and a Proposal 26 TAX L. Rv. 369 (1971) (providing the classic analysis of
the tax law's debt/equity distinction).
180 See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text (discussing OL) regime in the United
States).
181 See Ring, supra note 65, at 88-89.
1L See id. at 90-92 (noting differences in U.S. and Japanese treatment of OLD).
18 See Tillinghast, supra note 8, at 47 (describing significance of inconsistencies be-
tween characterization of income under the U.S. and other systems).
184 An example of such subtle differences are those that give rise to the problem of in-
ternational tax arbitrage. See Mitchell A. Kane, Strategy and Cooperation in National Responses
to International Tax Arbitrage, 53 EMORY L.J. 89, 91 (2004) (describing tax arbitrage gener-
ally as a "situation [] in which a taxpayer achieves some tax benefit in virtue of an inconsis-
tency between the laws of two or more jurisdictions").
185 See A-Yonah, supra note 162, at 1584 ("[T]he lack of any uniform, worldwide system
of tax identification numbers means that most tax administrations are unable to match the
information they receive from their treaty partners with particular domestic taxpayers.").
188 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6039G, 6050, 6050L, 6050P (2000 & Supp. V 3005) (requiring
disclosure of TINs as a component of reporting particular transactions).
187 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 162, at 1584.
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ritorial tax information consistent with U.S. tax principles is available, it
may not be very usefuil.188 Unless a party reporting ordinary cash inter-
est paid to a U.S. taxpayer were also persuaded to collect a U.S. tax-
payer identification number and provide it along with the interest in-
formation, U.S. tax authorities may be unable to derive much benefit
from the information. 189
2. Exterritorial Ex Post Information Acquisition
Most of the obstacles to acquiring ex ante extraterritorial tax in-
formation do not affect U.S. tax authorities' investigative power.190 The
lack of TINs, for example, is more of a nuisance than a significant im-
pediment if authorities are focused on the activities and income of a
single taxpayer. Jurisdiction, however, is every bit as problematic for
U.S. tax authorities when they attempt to conduct investigations as it is
in the context of observation. 191 Because they lack the power to compel
foreign third parties to provide extraterritorial tax information, U.S.
investigators generally have little access to third-party information that
could confirm or counter the information taxpayers voluntarily report
about their own activities. 92 As a result, tax authorities have no choice
but to seek assistance from the very taxpayers under investigation.
Unsurprisingly, taxpayers tend to see little benefit in cooperating
with investigators. 193 To give U.S. authorities greater leverage, Congress
18 Letter from Mark W. Everson, Dep't of the Treasury, to the Honorable Max Baucus,
Ranking Member, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin. 2 (June 12, 2006) [hereinafter Everson
Letter], reprinted in Everson Explains U.S. IRS. 's Use of Foreigi-Source Income Data, WORLD-
WIDE TAX DAILY, June 16, 2006 (citing lack of TINs as one of the key problems to making
effective use of existing information exchange agreements).
189 See id.
190 By the same token, during the course of a given investigation, U.S. authorities
should have little difficulty adapting extraterritorial tax information to conform to U.S. tax
principles.
191 In one recent instance, authorities solved the problem posed by their lack of juris-
diction over foreign banks by issuing a "John Doe" summons for the credit card records of
U.S. retailers, including Lenscrafters and CompuServe, to "reveal the identities of persons
known to have paid for transactions with these merchants using a MasterCard payment
card issued by a bank in Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, or the Cayman Islands." In re
Tax Liabilities of John Does, 91 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2003433, 1 2003-327 (S.D. Ohio 2002)
(granting motion to issue third-party John Doe summonses). In this case, investigators
were able to identify domestic actors with access to the information they needed and were
thus able to compel its production. See id. Generally, they will not have that luxury.
192 See Tillinghast, supra note 8, at 39.
193 That lack of cooperation can hobble an investigation. See Edmund L. Andrews,
I.R.S. Curtails Many Audits in Tax Havens, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2007, at CI ("In one case ...
the I.R.S. spent four years investigating a person with businesses in both the United States
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created a statute that prevents taxpayers from failing to supply informa-
tion during an investigation only to later introduce that "foreign-based
documentation" at trial. 194 Unfortunately, it appears these efforts have
not been successful in leveling the playing field. The current environ-
ment often leaves investigators unable to successfully complete (and
sometimes unwilling to initiate) audits of taxpayers suspected of off-
shore tax evasion. 195
C. Different Needs for Different Countries
A.s is evident, governments face an array of obstacles to their acqui-
sition of extraterritorial tax information. 196 At the same time, their
need for that information is broad and continues to grow.197 But coun-
tries not only need a great deal of extraterritorial tax information. They
are also likely to have different needs for such information. Several ex-
amples illustrate this point.
As previously discussed, individuals who are U.S. citizens and resi-
dents are subject to U.S. income tax on their worldwide income. 198 In
and an unnamed overseas tax haven. The investigation included 20 summonses, 23 de-
mands for documents, 5 missed appointments and 2 refusals by the person being investi-
gated to supply information. After four years, the government still did not know how much
money had been moved to the tax haven.").
'- I.R.C. § 982 (2000). The statute provides that in any case in which authorities pre-
sent a taxpayer with a "formal document request" and the taxpayer proves unwilling or
unable to provide the information during the course of their examination "any court hav-
ing jurisdiction of a civil proceeding . .. shall prohibit the introduction by the taxpayer of
any foreign-based documentation covered by such request." I.R.C. § 982(a). A "formal
document request" covered by the provision must be "mailed by registered or certified
mail to the taxpayer at his last known address" and specify when and where the informa-
tion must be provided, along with a description of the required information and the con-
sequences of a failure to produce it. I.R.C. § 982(c) (1). A taxpayer may avoid application
of the statute when the failure to produce the information is due to "reasonable cause."
I.R.C. § 982(b) (1). However, the fact that "a foreign jurisdiction would impose a civil or
criminal penalty on the taxpayer (or any other person) for disclosing the requested docu-
mentation is not reasonable cause." I.R.C. § 982(b) (2).
19 Andrews, supra note 193 ("The Internal Revenue Service is curtailing audits of
many people who use offshore tax havens, even when agents see signs of tax evasion, be-
cause agents fear they cannot meet a three-year deadline for fimishing an examination
196 See supra notes 141-195 and accompanying text.
197 See Vito Tanzi, Is There a Need for a World Tax Organization?, in THE ECONOMICS OF
GLOBALIZATION: POLICY PERSPECTIVES FROM PUBLIC ECONOMICS 173, 173-86 (Assaf Razin
& Efraim Sadka eds., 1999) (noting "policy-makers are lagging behind the recent techno-
logical developments in the financial markets").
198 See Cook, 265 U.S. at 54-56 (concluding that income of U.S. citizens, even in the ab-
sence of an), connection between the income and the United States, is subject to the U.S.
income tax); Kirsch, supra note 141, at 870.
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addition to being subject to U.S. tax on income they earn directly, U.S.
taxpayers are sometimes taxed on income earned by foreign entities. 99
For example, shareholders of foreign corporations that earn large
amounts of "passive" income 200-Passive Foreign Investment Compa-
nies ("PFICs")-can elect to be taxed currently on income earned by
the foreign corporation under the Qualified Electing Fund ("QEF")
regime. 2 1 The intent of these provisions is to "remove the economic
benefit attributable to tax deferral" for PFIC investors.202 But because
U.S. tax authorities have only limited access to PFIC information from
overseas, rates of voluntary compliance with respect to foreign income
are likely to be relatively low when compared to similar domestic in-
come. Likewise, U.S. corporations face different risks and rewards with
respect to underreporting their foreign income than with respect to
income earned domestically. The variety of information tax authorities
need to ensure compliance with these foreign income regimes illus-
trates the need for wide-ranging types of extraterritorial tax informa-
tion. For example, the ex ante extraterritorial tax information that U.S.
tax authorities might use, generally, to monitor U.S. taxpayers' compli-
ance with the complex QEF regime2 03 bears virtually no resemblance to
the ex post information that would be useful during the course of an
investigation of a single taxpayer suspected of underreporting the
amount of interest earned in a hidden offshore bank account. As with
199 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 951 (West Supp. LV 2008) (amended by Pub. L. No. 110-72, 121
Stat. 2476 (2007)) (requiring "U.S. shareholders" of "controlled foreign corporations" to
include certain categories of undistributed corporate income currently); I.R.C. §§ 1293,
1296 (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (taxing shareholders of certain "passive foreign investment
companies" on income earned by those corporations before the income is distributed to
the shareholders).
200 I.R.C. §§ 954(c), 1297(b) (amended by Pub. L. No. 110-172, 121 Stat. 2475(2007))
(defining passive income as dividends, interest, and similar items).
201 I.R.C. § 1295 (2000) (allowing shareholders in PFIC to elect QEF treatment). As is
true of the OID rules discussed above, the mechanics of the QEF rules and of similar antide-
ferral regimes are much more complicated than the policy objective they serve. A PFIC is a
foreign corporation that earns a high percentage of "passive" income or holds a high per-
centage of passive assets. See I.R.C. § 1297(a). A PFIC shareholder can elect to treat any PFIC
as a QEF by filing an election. See I.R.C. § 1295.
202 BORIS 1. BITrER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA-
TIONS & SHAREHOLDERS 1 15.44[3] (Thomson 7th ed. 2006).
203 To satisfy the QEF requirements, shareholders must report detailed information
about the earnings of the foreign corporation in which they hold a stake. Given the limita-
tions of their capacity to acquire extraterritorial tax information, U.S. tax authorities have
little opportunity to verify the information voluntarily reported by taxpayers through ei-
ther observation or investigation. With greater access to ex ante or ex post information,
authorities could encourage greater voluntary compliance and would be better positioned
to identify and correct compliance failures.
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the information tax authorities use to monitor compliance with the
OID rules, the ex ante information for QEF monitoring purposes
would require more than a record of payments made or received. In-
stead, for tax authorities to accurately determine the tax consequences
of owning shares in a QEF, they require detailed information about the
nature of the foreign entity's activities and assets. 20 4 With these two very
different sorts of information in mind (i.e. ex post interest information
and ex ante QEF information), it is not difficult to imagine that juris-
dictions confronting different enforcement issues based on unique re-
gimes might have very different appetites for extraterritorial tax infor-
mation.
At the most basic level, those differences are likely to be a func-
tion of the sophistication of the tax system in question. A tax system
that incorporates concepts such as OID and QEFs is likely to demand
more information, both in terms of quantity and quality, than a coun-
try that has only a rudimentary income tax or no income tax at all.
Similarly, a jurisdiction that relies heavily on observation and ex ante
information reporting will need far more information than a country
that favors ex post methods. Those disparities are likely to be corre-
lated with differences in size and national wealth, because countries
with the greatest need for tax information are likely to be relatively
large, wealthy countries with sophisticated economies and ample ad-
ministrative resources like the United States. To the extent those rela-
tively wealthy countries tend to be capital exporters20 5 rather than
capital importers, the differences in their relative needs will be exac-
erbated. As a result, there are almost certain to be major systematic
differences in both the types and volumes of extraterritorial tax in-
formation needed by different countries.
A simple, if somewhat stylized, example may help to frame the dis-
cussion of the existing extraterritorial tax information acquisition re-
gime and to explain the need for change. Imagine a large, wealthy
country and a significantly smaller and less economically developed
neighbor. In part because of their proximity, a considerable amount of
cross-border activity links the two countries. The first country employs
an income tax that employs sophisticated concepts comparable to OID,
204 For example, the amount and character of QEF income imputed to a taxpayer in any
given year can depend on the PFIC's percentage ownership of its subsidiaries. See, e.g., I.R.C.
§ 1298(a) (2), (b) (8) (distinguishing between corporations based on percentage ownership).
.05 Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 939, 989 (2000) (ob-
serving that developing countries are disproportionately likely to be capital importers).
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while the second imposes only a sales tax that applies to goods pur-
chased abroad and used domestically.
Both countries would benefit significantly from receiving extrater-
ritorial tax information on par with the information they receive from
domestic sources. For the smaller country, that information might con-
sist of a limited amount of ex post data regarding purchases made
abroad by its residents. The larger country is likely to have the capacity
to process a high volume of ex ante extraterritorial tax information. As
a result, although the two governments share an appetite for extraterri-
torial tax information, the type, amount, and timing of information
each would like to receive are dramatically different. Creating a system
that produces a healthy flow of information and ensures that both
countries shoulder burdens commensurate with the benefits they ex-
pect to derive poses considerable challenges.
III. THE INCOMPLETE MARKET FOR EXTRATERRITORIAL
TAX INFORMATION
Although extraterritorial tax information has become far more
elusive and important since the early days of the income tax, the pri-
mary tool used to acquire it has, if anything, become less potent. At the
same time, even though jurisdictions have developed very different ap-
petites for extraterritorial tax information, the eighty-year-old barter
mechanism used to facilitate the cross-border flow of tax information
continues to presuppose a level of cross-border symmetry that may
never have really existed. Part IV asks whether a more complete mar-
ket, in which countries are free to use cash consideration and to regit-
larly acquire extraterritorial tax information other than simple lists of
raw data, might help to close the growing gap between the amount of
information jurisdictions would like to have and the amount they cur-
rently receive. 20 6 This Part sets the stage for that discussion by tracing
the history of the extraterritorial tax information barter system. 20 7
Just as the architects of the international system originally envi-
sioned, countries rely on reciprocal information exchange provisions of
international agreements to ensure access to information that would
otherwise lie out of their reach. 20 8 Surprisingly even as the need for
extraterritorial tax information has expanded, the rights countries ac-
206 See infra notes 337-411 and accompanying text.
207 See infra notes 208-336 and accompanying text.
208 See, e.g., U.S. 2006 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26; U.N. 2001 Model Con-
vention, supra note 16, art. 26; OECD 2005 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26.
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quire under those agreements have become weaker.2 9 In some re-
spects, the changes are so stark that modern information exchange
provisions are actually designed to prevent the exchange of informa-
tion that once flowed automatically.210 As a result, in contrast to their
ample capacity to procure tax information domestically, governments
have access to a relatively limited amount of extraterritorial tax infor-
mation.
This Part begins by describing the League of Nation's (the
"League") 1927 Draft of a Bilateral Convention on Administrative Assis-
tance in Matters of Taxation, which represented the first attempt to
create a global solution to the problem of acquiring extraterritorial tax
information.2 11 That model agreement essentially proposed that each
country buy access from other countries to extraterritorial tax informa-
tion, including ex ante information, with a pledge to provide them with
comparable information. 212 This Part then explains how the principles
of that model information exchange agreement were reduced to prac-
tice and explores subsequent developments in the market for extrater-
ritorial tax information. 213 Finally, it considers the extent to which in-
formation exchange has succeeded in providing U.S. tax authorities
with the information necessary to enforce the income tax.2 14 It con-
209 See infra notes 245-317 and accompanying text.
210 See infra note 283 and accompanying text (noting that today's information ex-
change provisions fall far short of those in the 1939 treaty between the United States and
Sweden). Compare U.S. 2006 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26, U.N. 2001 Model
Convention, supra note 16, art. 26, and OECD 2005 Model Convention, supra note 16, art.
26, with Convention Respecting Double Taxation, U.S.-Swed., Mar. 23, 1939, 54 Stat. 1759
[hereinafter U.S.-Sweden 1939 Treaty].
211 See infra notes 216-244 and accompanying text.
212 See 1927 Report, supra note 21, at 22-23. Tax authorities have a choice as to how they
acquire tax information. They can either compel its production or bargain for it. Most
countries, including the United States, do both. As described above, they rely more on
compulsion than bargaining domestically. By necessity, they bargain for extraterritorial tax
information. One obvious explanation for favoring compulsion over bargaining domesti-
cally is that it obviates the need for tax authorities to communicate individually with do-
mestic employers and financial institutions to gain access to information about taxpayers.
Instead, the government simply requires those private actors to supply that information,
typically without providing compensation. Within its own borders, there is simply no rea-
son for a tax authority to bargain for information. In gathering extraterritorial tax infor-
mation, however, a tax authority frequently finds itself in a very different position. Since
the 1920s, countries have recognized the need to bargain with one another to acquire
extraterritorial tax information.
213 See infra notes 245-317 and accompanying text.
214 See infra notes 318-336 and accompanying text.
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cludes that the current barter regime has fallen far short of that goal
and explores the reasons for its failure.215
A. The 192 7 Report
Tax authorities routinely receive extraterritorial tax information
from foreign governments. 16 Often, as described in the next Section,
that information is provided pursuant to the tax information ex-
change provisions of a broad bilateral tax treaty or pursuant to a free-
standing tax information exchange agreement.2 7 The origins of those
obligations can be traced back to the work of the League of Nations
in the post-World War I era.218
It would be difficult to overstate the significance of the work of the
committees and experts that culminated in the production of the 1928
model double taxation treaty219 that formed the basis for the bilateral
double tax treaties that are the foundation of today's very successful
international tax regime.2 20 Despite relatively minor differences of
opinion as to exactly how much credit those experts deserve,22 1 there is
215 See infra notes 318-336 and accompanying text.
216 See U.S. 2006 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26; U.N. 2001 Model Conven-
tion, supra note 16, art. 26 (providing for information exchange within bilateral double
taxation treaties); OECD 2005 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26; MichaelJ. Graetz,
Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies,
26 BROOK.J. INT'L L. 1357, 1358 (2001) (estimating the existence of more than 1700 bilat-
eral double tax treaties); Zagaris, supra note 160, at 349 (discussing often voluminous in-
formation received).
217 See, e.g., U.S. 2006 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26; U.N. 2001 Model Con-
vention, supra note 16, art. 26. (providing for information exchange within bilateral dou-
ble taxation treaties); OECD 2005 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26; Zagaris, supra
note 160, at 332-57 (discussing recent proliferation of stand-alone tax information ex-
change agreements ("TIEAs")).
218 See generally Report Presented by the General Meeting of Government Experts on Double Taxa-
tion and Tax Evasion, League of Nations Doc. C.562.M.178 H 1928 (1928) [hereinafter 1928
Government Experts Report]; 1927 Report, supra note 16.
219 See 1928 Government Experts Report, supra note 218, at 7-21.
220 See Reuven Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplifica-
tion, 74 TEx. L. Rrv. 1301, 1306 (1996) (noting that the principles of a 1923 League of
Nations report underlie the current consensus regarding the structure of international
taxation). Avi-Yonah refers to the current international tax regime as a "miracle," albeit a
"flawed" one. See id. at 1303-04. According to Avi-Yonah, the fact that "a coherent interna-
tional tax regime exists that enjoys nearly universal support" and that is "based on volun-
tary consensus" makes it "one of the major achievements of twentieth-century interna-
tional law." See id.
221 Compare id. at 1306 (noting continued influence of principles embodied in 1923
League of Nations report), with Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The "Original In-
tent" of U.S. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1066 n.181 (1997) (noting that the
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broad consensus that but for their efforts, today's international tax
landscape would look quite different. The year before that model treaty
was published, the League's Committee of Technical Experts on Dou-
ble Taxation and Tax Evasion presented its "general and final re-
port."222 That report presented four separate model tax conventions.223
One of those models, the Draft Convention on Administrative Assis-
tance in Matters of Taxation, specifically addressed the acquisition of
extraterritorial tax information. 224
That model, like the other three, was structured as a bilateral
agreement between an unnamed pair of countries. 225 The draft speci-
fied that each government would be obligated to provide the other
with extraterritorial tax information both (i) "following a request con-
cerning concrete cases '"226 and (ii) automatically for enumerated cate-
gories of information. 227 Those two distinct requirements parallel the
ex post and ex ante methods of acquiring domestic tax information
discussed above. 228 The first, a requirement that each country provide
information to the other when served with a specific request for infor-
mation, permits a country to supplement its domestic investigative ca-
pacity2 29 As in the domestic context, that investigative power is paired
with a right to receive a steady stream of ex ante information.230 Those
rights to ex ante information facilitate observation while the ex post
rights provide assurance that additional extraterritorial tax information
can be obtained when necessary.23'
historical "role of the International Chamber [of Commerce]" in the development of the
tax treaty movement "has been neglected somewhat in recent scholarship").
222 1927 Report, supra note 16, at 5.
223 The four drafts were the Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of Double Taxa-
tion, the Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of Double Taxation in the Special Matter
of Succession Duties, the Bilateral Convention on Administrative Assistance in Matters of
Taxation, and the Bilateral Convention on Judicial Assistance in the Collection of Taxes.
Id. at 10-30.
224 Id. at 22-23.
225 Id. at 10-30. The choice of a bilateral treaty over a multilateral, or "collective" in
the report's terminology, form was driven primarily by the goal of eliminating double taxa-
tion. Id. at 8 ("In the matter of double taxation in particular, the fiscal systems of the ,ari-
ous countries are so fundamentally different that it seems practically impossible to draft a
collective convention . ..
-26 Id. at 22.
7 1927 Report, supra note 16, at 22.
228 See id.
229 See id.
230 See id.
231 See id.
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The draft specified the information regarding "natural or juristic
persons taxable in one of the two contracting countries" that was to be
supplied automatically. 232 That information was to "include the names
... and ... residence[s] of the persons concerned, and their family re-
sponsibilities, if any .... ,"233 In addition to that background informa-
tion, the draft listed six categories with respect to which extraterritorial
tax information was to be provided: (1) inmovable property; (2) mort-
gages; (3) industrial, agricultural, and commercial undertakings; (4)
earned income and directors fees; (5) transferable securities; and (6)
estates. 234 With respect to the fifth item, transferable securities, the
model language stated that "any information collected by an admini-
stration" 35 should be provided but added "more especially in connec-
tion with exemption or relief granted by that authority by reason of the
taxpayer's domicile or nationality."236
The remainder of the treaty established procedures to allow the
participating states to carry out its terms.23 7 Each country was expressly
granted the right to refuse to provide information when supplying that
information would be "contrary to public policy."2 38 The treaty estab-
lished channels of communication between relevant administrative au-
thorities to give effect to the provisions and create measures to imple-
ment the convention.2 39 Finally, the draft made clear that information
would be the only permissible consideration by explicitly requiring that
"administrative assistance.., be given without payment ... "240
The 1927 model is remarkable for a number of reasons. On the
one hand, it clearly demonstrates that the significance of extraterrito-
rial tax information was apparent even in the early days of the income
tax.2 41 On the other hand, to anyone familiar with today's information
232 1927 Report, supra note 16, at 22.
23 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id. The official commentary explained that "a country which, in the normal course
of its fiscal administration, obtains possession of [such information] ... should impart, on
a reciprocal basis, that information to a foreign State which is interested in the matter
from the point of view of the equitable distribution of taxation." Id. at 24.
236 Id. at 22. When a taxpayer discloses its residence in the foreign jurisdiction as a con-
dition of achieving preferred tax status, the drafters saw a clear duty to report that infor-
mation to the foreign jurisdiction. Id. at 24.
237 1927 Report, supra note 16, at 22-23.
238 Id. at 23.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 See id.
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exchange provisions, it reveals how wan subsequent efforts to facilitate
the acquisition of extraterritorial tax information have become. 242
Despite the enormous growth of both the role and the sophistica-
tion of the income tax since the 1920s, the League's Draft of a Bilateral
Convention on Administrative Assistance in Matters of Taxation repre-
sents a high-water mark in extraterritorial tax information acquisition
rights. As described below, relatively few international agreements focus
specifically on administrative assistance in tax matters. 243 More impor-
tantly, current bilateral and multilateral agreements that provide for
the acquisition of extraterritorial tax information simply do not call for
the same degree of information sharing required by the 1927 model.244
As a result, although they provide tax authorities with the capacity to
investigate taxpayers' extraterritorial activities, they do not give tax au-
thorities the power to observe. The following Section provides an over-
view of the road that leads from the relatively ambitious 1927 draft to
the more modest extraterritorial tax information provisions of the
state-of-the-art 2006 U.S. model tax treaty.
B. The Decline of Information Exchange
The four model conventions introduced by the League of Nations
in 1927245 enjoyed very different levels of success. The model designed
to prevent the double taxation of income stands head and shoulders
above the others.246 The concepts it introduced have become so impor-
242 See infra notes 245-317 and accompanying text (describing decline of information
exchange in later treaties).
243 See, e.g., U.S. 2006 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26; U.N. 2001 Model Con-
vention, supra note 16, art. 26. (providing for information exchange within bilateral dou-
ble taxation treaties); OECD 2005 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26; Graetz, supra
note 216, at 1358.
244 See, e.g., U.S. 2006 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26; U.N. 2001 Model Con-
vention, supra note 16, art. 26; OECD 2005 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26. An-
other way to view the difference between the old and new provisions is to see the older
language as relatively "hard" law and the newer language as relatively "soft." See Claire R.
Kelly, Realist Theory and Real Constraints, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 545, 575-77 (2004) (explaining
hard/soft distinction). In other words, although they embrace information exchange in
principle, unlike the 1927 model, today's treaties do not create clear entitlements to spe-
cific items of information. See, e.g., U.S. 2006 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26;
U.N. 2001 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26; OECD 2005 Model Convention, supra
note 16, art. 26.
245 The treaties were published again in 1928, with some variations. See 1928 Govern-
ment Experts Report, supra note 218, at 7-33.
246 SeeJohn F. AveryJones, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Are Tax Treaties Necessary?, 53
TAX L. REv. 1, 1 (1999) (describing double tax treaties as a "very considerable success
story for the OECD and its predecessors, the League of Nations, and the OEEC").
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tant that today three principal models, each with roots in the 1927
model, vie for influence over the design of double tax treaties. 247 An
enormous number of bilateral treaties bearing the hallmarks of the
1927 model double tax treaty are currently in force. 248 The same can-
not be said of the 1927 model administrative assistance convention.
While double tax treaties grew ever more popular and evolved to re-
main effective, despite the increasing sophistication of taxpayers and of
domestic tax systems, 249 and to withstand the pressures of globaliza-
tion,2 50 information exchange shriveled.2 51 Unlike the 1927 draft, most
modern information exchange provisions are little more than a state-
ment of general principles. 252 As a result, countries simply do not have
adequate access to extraterritorial tax information.
1. London and Mexico Drafts
In the 1940s, the League of Nations followed on its earlier work
by issuing two sets of model tax treaties just a few years apart. 25 3 In
1943, the League published the so-called Mexico drafts and shortly
thereafter published the 1946 London drafts.254 Both the Mexico and
the London drafts included both a model double tax treaty and a
model treaty focused on administrative assistance. 255
247 See generally 2006 U.S. Model Convention, supra note 16; U.N. 2001 Model Conven-
tion, supra note 16; OECD 2005 Model Convention, supra note 16.
248 Graetz, supra note 216, at 1358.
249 See, e.g., 2006 U.S. Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 11(2)(b) (specifying treat-
ment of contingent debt instruments).
250 See, e.g., id. art. 22 (imposing limitations on benefits of forming shell corporations
in treaty jurisdictions); see also UNITED STATES MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION AccoM-
PANYING THE UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15, 2006, at
63 (2006) [hereinafter U.S. 2006 MODEL TREATY TECHNICAL EXPLANATION], available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/hp16802.pdf (noting that Article 22 of the
treaty is intended to prevent taxpayers from engaging in "treaty shopping").
251 See U.S. 2006 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26; U.N. 2001 Model Conven-
tion, supra note 16, art. 26; OECD 2005 Model Convention art. 26, supra note 16, art. 26.
252 See U.S. 2006 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26; U.N. 2001 Model Conven-
tion, supra note 16, art. 26; OECD 2005 Model Convention art. 26, supra note 16, art. 26.
253 See Fiscal Conm., London and Mexico Model Tax Conventions: Commentary and Text,
League of Nations Doc. No. C.88.M.88.1946.U.A., at 6 (1946) [hereinafter London & Alex-
ico Conventions].
254 Id.
255 Id. at 58-85 (Model Bilateral Conventions for the Prevention of the Double Taxa-
tion of Income and Property); id. at 100-17 (Model Bilateral Convention for the Estab-
lishment of Reciprocal Administrative Assistance for the Assessment and Collection of
Direct Taxes; Model Bilateral Convention for the Establishment of Reciprocal Administra-
tive Assistance for the Assessment and Collection of Taxes on Income, Property, Estates
and Successions).
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Each was, in many respects, similar to the drafts published more
than a decade earlier. Like the prior draft, both the 1943 and 1946 ad-
ministrative assistance drafts spelled out in detail the items of informa-
tion each state was obliged to provide. 256 There were also, however, sig-
nificant changes from the 1927 version.25 7 Rather than creating two
distinct drafts to deal with administrative assistance and judicial en-
forcement, the Mexico and London drafts combined them into a single
treaty.258
The pair of drafts highlights the fundamental tension created by
the barter exchange model, particularly with respect to the automatic
exchange of information requirement. Although the later London
draft required "readily available information" to be provided automati-
cally, the earlier Mexico draft merely made the supply of that informa-
tion nondiscretionar. 259 As explained by the official commentary, the
requirement that information be supplied automatically was initially
thought to "work satisfactorily only in the case of countries having a
very well-established tax system and administration." 260 Despite their
concerns that a one-size-fits-all approach would not always work, by the
time of the London draft, the League decided to include the automatic
exchange requirement.
2. Bilateral Double Tax Treaties
Even before the League created the Mexico and London drafts of
its administrative assistance treaty, the concept of a stand-alone admin-
istrative assistance treaty had begun to give way.261 As illustrated by
some of the earliest U.S. double tax treaties, instead of creating one
treaty for fighting double taxation and another to combat fiscal eva-
.56 See id. at 102-03 (requiring that each state provide the name and address of any
person deriving income from that state and having an address in the other and to provide
all information obtained from financial institutions relating to persons with an address in
the other state). Both the London and Mexico drafts contain this requirement. Id.
257 Compare id. at 100-17, with 1927 Report, supra note 16, at 22-30.
258 Compare London & Mexico Conventions, supra note 253, at 100-17, with 1927 Report,
supra note 16, at 22-30. The commentary explained that the two treaties were combined in
part because "the kind of co-operation which is required for reciprocal assistance between
administrations for the assessment and for the collection of taxes is substantially the same
in both fields." London & Mexico Conventions, supra note 253, at 44.
259 See London & Mexico Conventions, supra note 253, at 51.
260 See id.
261 See, e.g., U.S.-Sweden 1939 Treaty, supra note 210, art. XVI (incorporating informa-
tion exchange); Income Tax Convention Respecting Double Taxation art. 21, U.S.-Fr., July
25, 1939, 59 Stat. 893 (hereinafter U.S.-France 1939 Treaty] (incorporating information
exchange).
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sion, a single treaty was designed to serve both purposes. 2 62 Ultimately,
that combination proved a mixed blessing for extraterritorial tax in-
formation acquisition.
In one sense, abandoning the separate administrative assistance
treaty in favor of a hybrid treaty served to firther the goal of facilitat-
ing extraterritorial tax information acquisition. Given the ubiquity of
double tax treaties, it seems likely that the pairing may have created
information exchange relationships that would not have existed oth-
erwise. 263 At the same time, by relegating information exchange to a
supporting role, the combination both diluted and limited the impact
of the information exchange requirement. As the significance of the
treaties' double tax provisions came to predominate, the information
exchange provisions became more modest.2 64 In addition, gaps in the
262 See, e.g., U.S.-Sweden 1939 Treaty, supra note 210, art. XVI; U.S.-Francle 1939 Treaty,
supra note 261, art. 21.
263 For example, less than a year after a U.S. effort to create a "system for international
exchange of tax data through which the participating countries will be able to locate funds
which their nationals have invested or have on balance abroad," faltered, see E.S. Duffield,
System Proposed for International Tax Data Exchange, WALL ST. J., June 22, 1937, at 1, the United
States "began discussions [with Sweden] looking toward a treaty between the two countries
on interchange of tax information." See U.S. and Sweden Treaty Talks, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13,
1938, at 9. Although the United States had intended to advance information exchange
through the League of Nations in 1937, the League rejected it. See To Join Geneva Tax Talk,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1937, at 17 (noting U.S. intent to advance its information exchange
plan at a meeting of the League of Nations); LeagueDodges Tax Plan, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 20 1937,
at 19 (noting the League's rejection of the plan because of objections to requiring their citi-
zens to supply information needed only by a foreign state). The U.S.-Sweden treaty ultimately
contained both information exchange provisions and elements designed to mitigate double
taxation. See general/y U.S.-Sweden 1939 Treaty, supra note 210. By comparison, the very first
treaty with Canada contained no provisions on information exchange. Convention Concern-
ing Income Taxation, U.S.-Can., Dec. 30, 1936, 50 Stat. 1399. Information exchange with
Canada was originally implemented by regulation. See U.S. and Canada to Swap Tax Data on
Their Citizens, CHRISTMAN Sct. MoNrToR, Oct. 6, 1937, at 10.
264 One of the earliest U.S. tax treaties contained information exchange provisions at
least as potent as those in the League of Nations models. Article XVI of the 1939 U.S.-
Sweden Treaty required the following of the United States:
1. In accordance with the preceding Article, the competent authorities of the
United States of America shall forward to the competent authorities of Swe-
den as soon as practicable after the close of each calendar year the following
information relating to such calendar year:
(a) The names and addresses of all addressees within Sweden deriving
from sources within the United States of America dividends, interest, royal-
ties, pensions, annuities, or other fixed or determinable annual or periodical
income, showing the amount of such income with respect to each addressee;
(b) Any particulars which the competent United States authorities may ob-
tain from banks, savings banks or other similar institutions concerning assets
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international network of double tax treaties became an important ob-
stacle to the flow of extraterritorial tax information between jurisdic-
tions that did not share a double tax treaty.265
To understand how radically the terms of a typical information
exchange provision have changed over the years, it is helpful to com-
pare several pre-1950 treaties with a modern information exchange
provision. The model tax treaty published by the United States in 2006
includes a typical modern "Exchange of Information" article. 266 That
article states that the tax authorities of the two parties "shall exchange
such information as may be relevant for carrying out the provisions of
this Convention or of the domestic laws of the Contracting States con-
cerning taxes .... "267 The requirement that each state provide infor-
mation sought by the other clearly offers a powerful extraterritorial tax
information acquisition tool.268 Nevertheless, by contrast with the 1927
model or even the early U.S.-Sweden tax treaty, 269 the rights granted by
the 2006 U.S. model information exchange provisions are relatively
modest. They contain no specific requirements for information disclo-
sure, much less automatic disclosures of particular information. 270
The 2006 U.S. model, like most modern treaties, takes the ap-
proach of the Mexico draft by making information exchange manda-
tory, but not automatic. 271 On the one hand, so long as the information
bears the necessary relationship to taxation, and providing the infor-
mation would not "be contrary to public policy," each treaty partner is
belonging to individuals resident in Sweden or to Swedish corporations or
other entities.
U.S.-Sweden 1939 Treaty, supra note 210, art. XVI. As explained below, the rights provided
by today's information exchange provisions fall far short of those granted by that early
U.S.-Sweden treaty. See infra notes 271-283 and accompanying text.
265 See Zagaris, supra note 160, at 332-34 (describing recent efforts to fill those gaps
with TIEAs).
2- U.S. 2006 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26.
267 Id. art. 26(1).
268 See id.
269 Compare id., with U.S.-Sweden 1939 Treaty, supra note 210, art. XVI and 1927 Report,
supra note 16, at 22-25.
270 See U.S. 2006 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26.
271 See id. The difference between mandatory and automatic information exchange is
similar to that between ex ante and ex post information acquisition in the domestic con-
text. Automatic information exchange occurs when at specified times each partner pro-
vides information meeting conditions established in advance. The 1939 U.S.-Sweden
Treaty provides an excellent illustration of automatic information exchange. See U.S.-
Sweden 1939 Treaty, supra note 210, art. XVI. By contrast, mandatory information ex-
change requires a request. SeeU.S. 2006 Model Convention, supranotel6, art. 26(4).
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bound to satisfy any requests.2 72 On the other hand, the model lan-
guage does not require information to be provided automatically.273 By
contrast, the 1927 and 1946 models mandated extensive automatic in-
formation exchange.2 74 When the United States published its first
model tax treaty in 1976, it made the mandatory approach standard.275
In practice, certain kinds of information are routinely exchanged,27 6 in
some cases in electronic format,277 but those exchanges take place de-
spite the apparent absence of any formal commitment under modern
bilateral tax treaties to automatically exchange information.2 78 Auto-
matic exchange is not expressly called for under either the current U.S.
or OECD model. 279
The technical explanation that accompanied the issuance of the
2006 model treaty offers some indication as to the breadth of informa-
tion covered by the article and the extent to which countries' access to
extraterritorial tax information has diminished in recent decades. 28
The explanation states that the model treaty language does not impose
272 See U.S. 2006 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26(3) (c).
273 See id. art. 26.
274 See London & Alexico Conventions, supra note 253, at 102-03; 1927 Report, supra note
16, at 22-23.
275 See U.S. Model Income Tax Convention (1976) art. 26, reprinted in SEVENTH ANNUAL
INST. ON INT'L TAXATION 291, 341-43 (1976).
276 Zagaris, supra note 160, at 348 ("The IRS routinely exchanges information about
taxpayer receipts of 'passive' or investment income, such as dividends, interest, royalties,
and rents. Under the program the IRS furnishes its tax treaty partners United States-based
withholding information for taxpayers who claim foreign taxpayer status and who file IRS
Form 1042S. From IRS Form 1042S the IRS develops IRS Form 5335 that it furnishes to
the treaty partners.")
277 OECD MANUAL, supra note 24, 11 4-13.
278 For years, prior to the adoption of new withholding regulations in 2001, the United
States unilaterally obligated itself to provide extraterritorial tax information to jurisdic-
tions with which it had treaty relationships. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1461-2(d) (1984); 49 Fed.
Reg. 36,830, 36,835 (1984) ("If a foreign country has entered into an income tax treaty
with the United States which provides for the mutual exchange of information, the Com-
missioner shall, as soon as practicable after the close of a calendar year during which the
treaty is in effect, transmit to the appropriate authority designated in the treaty with that
country the information contained in Forms 1042S showing a payee with an address in the
country."). The current regulations do not include such a commitment. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1461-2 (as amended in 2005). It is striking that at a time when it actively sought in-
creased information from other nations, the United States would eliminate such a provi-
sion. See id.
279 In other words, each creates an obligation to supply relevant information, but does
not specify precisely what information must be provided or when it must be provided. See
U.S. 2006 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26(1) ("shall exchange such information
as may be relevant"); OECD 2005 Model Tax Convention, supra note 16, art. 26(1) ("shall
exchange such information as is foreseeably relevant").
28°See U.S. 2006 MODEL TREATY TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 250, at 86-90.
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an obligation to provide general financial information such as bank
records pertaining to residents of a treaty partner, but requires a spe-
cific showing that any information requested is in fact necessary to en-
force taxes. 281 Obviously, it is not surprising that U.S. tax authorities
have less access to extraterritorial tax information under the model
treaty than they do in the domestic context.282 Far more striking is that
the model treaty prevents U.S. tax authorities from even requesting ex
post information that they would have received on an ex ante basis un-
der the 1939 U.S..-Sweden treaty.2s 3
Taking a step back from the details of these agreements, it be-
comes clear that the information exchange provisions of today's dou-
ble tax treaties are important because of their ubiquity rather than
their utility.284 Even the most potent of today's information exchange
provisions fails to measure up to the benchmark established by the
League of Nations in the 1920s. Although they do provide authorities
with usefil extraterritorial investigative powers, 285 particularly with
281 See id. at 86. ("[T he language 'may be' would not support a request in which a
Contracting State simply asked for information regarding all bank accounts maintained by
residents of that Contracting State in the other Contracting State, or even all accounts
maintained by its residents with respect to a particular bank.").
22 Compare U.S. 2006 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26 (providing for exchange
of specific information which "may be relevant"), with I.R.C. §§ 6041-6042, 6111 (2000 &
Supp. V 2005) (requiring broad and varied types of third-party reporting).
283 Compare U.S.-Sweden 1939 Treaty, supra note 210, art. XVI, with U.S. 2006 Model Con-
vention, supra note 16, art. 26. One explanation for limitations of modern information ex-
change provisions is a concern for privacy and taxpayer rights. The tension is evident in re-
cent changes to the OECD model treaty. The OECD narrowed the information exchange
article of its model double tax treaty by replacing the word "necessary" with the phrase "fore-
seeable relevanL" COMMENTARY ON TnE ARTICLES OF THE 2005 OECD MODEL INCOME AND
CAPITAL TAX CONVENTION, art. 26 1 4.1 [hereinafter 2005 OECD COMMENTARY], reprinted in
OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL: CONDENSED VERSION-2005 &
KEY TAX FEATURES OF MEMBER COUNTRIES 2006, at 313 (Tiago Cassiano Neves ed., 2006).
The OECD explained that
[t] he standard of "foreseeable relevance" is intended to provide for exchange
of information in tax matters to the widest possible extent and, at the same
time, to clarify that Contracting States are not at liberty to engage in "fishing
expeditions" or to request information that is unlikely to be relevant to the
tax affairs of a given taxpayer.
Id. 5.
284 See Graetz, supra note 216, at 1358 (estimating the existence of more than 1700 bi-
lateral double tax treaties).
285 Although treaty information exchange provisions favor ex post information acquisi-
tion, it should be noted that even those investigative powers are more limited than their
domestic counterparts. Compare United States v. Luther, 481 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1973)
(permitting domestic fishing expeditions), with 2005 OECD COMMENTARY, supra note 283,
1 5 (prohibiting extraterritorial fishing expeditions).
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respect to ex ante information reporting, the, fall well short of the
results an ideal system might achieve. 286 Instead, the significance of
these information exchange provisions is primarily a function of how
pervasive double tax treaties have become. Because there are so many
double tax treaties, 87 and because nearly all of them contain informa-
tion exchange provisions based on one of the leading models, it
would not be unreasonable to conclude that they are responsible for
the bulk of the extraterritorial tax information countries receive.
As a result, the limitations of these arrangements pose a key obsta-
cle to closing what is sometimes referred to as the international tax
gap.2s8 One may easily grasp their first major shortcoming, the relatively
modest level of information flows they require, by comparing today's
treaties with the relatively bold requirements of earlier agreements.
The second principal downside is also in part a product of the "second-
fiddle" role information exchange plays in these treaties. 289 Because
their primary purpose is to limit duplicative taxes on international
commerce, bilateral double tax treaties are far more likely to exist be-
tween pairs of countries with strong commercial ties and large amounts
of cross-border investment.20 Because information flows do not always
mirror commercial ties, the significant gaps that exist in the global net-
work of double tax treaties meaningfully inhibit the flow of useful ex-
traterritorial tax information even while the impact of those gaps on
cross-border commerce is relatively modest. Pardy in response to those
shortcomings, in recent years, efforts to increase access to extraterrito-
rial tax information has led to a revival of the League of Nations' con-
cept of stand-alone administrative assistance agreements.
286 The kinds of specific, targeted information U.S. tax authorities rely on domestically,
such as ex ante OlD and tax shelter reporting by third parties, bears almost no resem-
blance to the unwieldy bulk taxpayer information transfers that take place within the
OECD. See generally OECD MANUAL, supra note 24, 4-17. Those transfers have been
criticized as woefully inadequate, and obviously fall far short of what U.S. tax authorities
receive from domestic sources. See Zagaris, supra note 160, at 349 ("The problem with
automatic exchanges is that they are so voluminous and occur years after the filing of the
returns. Moreover, they are often in foreign languages and in forms that are not consistent
among revenue authorities. These circumstances make automatic exchanges of informa-
tion difficult, time-consuming, and expensive to use.").
287 See Graetz, .supra note 216, at 1358.
288 See Guttentag & Avi-Yonah, supra note 157, at 100-01, 105.
289 See U.S. 2006 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26; U.N. 2001 Model Conven-
tion, supra note 16, art. 26 (providing for information exchange within bilateral double
taxation treaties); OECD 2005 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26.
290 See Allison D. Christians, Tax Treaties for Investntent and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: A
Case Study, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 639, 641 (2005) (noting that "there are currently no treaties
in force between the United States and any of the LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa.").
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3. Other Information Exchange Arrangements
Because of the limitations of the double tax treaty as a mechanism
for acquiring extraterritorial tax information and the increasing impor-
tance of this information, specialized administrative assistance treaties
have reemerged over the past few decades. 291 By the 1980s, the inade-
quacy of then-available approaches, essentially limited to the informa-
tion exchange articles embedded in double tax treaties and unilateral
efforts, had become apparent. 292 Governments with a growing appetite
for extraterritorial tax information responded by creating variations on
the basic information exchange concept.293 The United States initiated
a policy of entering into treaties that consisted of just an exchange of
information article and little else.294 On a parallel track, the OECD also
revived and updated the League of Nations' series of draft administra-
tive assistance conventions.295
The creation of the stand-alone tax information exchange agree-
ment ('IIEA") came in response to a 1981 U.S. report on tax evasion. 296
That report highlighted the ease with which U.S. taxpayers were able to
engage in tax flight.297 It suggested that TLEAs could make tax flight
more difficult by helping to close the gap left by the United States' reli-
ance on a network of double tax treaties that failed to include most of
the jurisdictions the United States considered tax havens. 298 By gaining
access to extraterritorial tax information from tax havens, the United
States hoped it could more easily investigate U.S. tax cheats. 299
Although the TIEAs were structured as symmetrical agreements,
giving each country access to information from the other, access to ex-
traterritorial tax information was much more important to the United
291 See Zagaris, supra note 160, at 333-34.
-92 See id.
93 See id.
294 See id.
_95 Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, Council of Eur.-
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Jan. 25, 1988, 1966 U.N.T.S.
216 [hereinafter COE/OECD 1988 Convention], available at http://untreaty.un.org/unts/
120001j144071/1 7/9/00014362.pdf.
296 See RICHARD A. GORDON, DEP'T OF TREASURY, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USE BY
UNITED STATES TAXPAYERS-AN OVERVIEW 212 (1981); see also Zagaris, supra note 160, at
333-34 (discussing influence of the 1981 report).
297 See GORDON, supra note 296, at 32-37.
'9 See id. at 212.
9 See id. at 212-13 (making recommendations to improve information exchange);
Zagaris, supra note 160, at 333-34.
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States than to its potential counterparties.300 To provide an incentive
for nations that had little interest in receiving information to enter into
information exchange agreements, the United States chose to grant
preferred status to participating countries. 3 01 That preferred status pro-
vides several benefits for a TIEA counterparty, including making it eas-
ier for U.S. taxpayers attending conventions in that jurisdiction to de-
duct expenses related to the convention.30 2 The existence of those
benefits presumably encouraged countries to at least enter into
TIEAs.303 As a result, the U.S. TIEA initiative enjoyed some success;30 4 it
failed, however, to provide a silver bullet for the tax flight problem. 30 5
During the same time period, the OECD published its first model
convention focusing on the collection, as opposed to the reduction, of
taxes.30 6 The 1981 OECD Model Administrative Assistance Convention
300 In connection with a recent OECD initiative to create stand-alone tax information ex-
change agreements with tax havens, a U.N. report noted that "[i]t is not very significant that
under the OECD Model TIFA, a cooperative tax haven jurisdiction ... can request informa-
tion from an OECD country .... because .... tax haven jurisdictions generally impose no or
low income taxes" and "would not be requesting any such information from the OECD
source country." U.N. Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Int'l Cooperation in Tax Matters, Tax
Treatment of Cross-Border Interest Income and Capital Flights: Recent Developments, 52, U.N. Doc.
ST/SG/AC.8/2003/L.10 (Dec. 15-19, 2003) [hereinafter U.N. Tax Experts Report], availabl
at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/NO3/427/20/PDF/NO342720.pdf?Open
Element.
-1 See I.R.C. § 274(h) (6) (2000); Cynthia Blum, Sharing Bank Deposit Information with
Other Countries: Should Tax Compliance or Privacy Claims Prevail?, 6 FLA. TAx REV. 579, 596
(2004); see also H.R. ReP. 98-266, at 28-29 (1983), as reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 643,
669-70 ("The committee believes that the favorable convention treatment should be avail-
able only to those countries which are willing to assist the United States in enforcing its tax
laws. Accordingly, the convention deduction is made available only for conventions in a
country that enters into an exchange of information agreement with the United States.").
Section 274(h) (6) was added in 1983. Pub. L. No. 98-67, § 222, 97 Stat. 369, 395 (1983).
- See I.R.C. § 274(h) (6) (treating eligible Caribbean countries as part of the North
American area and therefore eligible to host tax deductible conventions).
303 There is, of course, a big difference between entering into a treaty and wholeheart-
edly embracing it. See Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of
International Law, 72 U. Cut. L. REv. 469, 514-19 (2005) (discussing tendency of many
countries not to comply with treaties into which they enter). Professor Hathaway notes that
"collateral consequences of treaty membership can sometimes lead states with poor prac-
tices to commit to but not comply with a treaty." Id. at 514.
s04 Barbados was the first to enter into a TIEA with the United States. Blum, supra note
301, at 600 n.69. Over the next few years, some other countries followed suit. Id.
305 Recent estimates have put the amount of U.S. tax revenues lost to tax havens as
high as $70 billion per year. STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. TAX
HAVEN ABUSES: THE ENABLERS, THE TOOLS, & SECRECY I (Comm. Print 2006), available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/TAXHAVENABUSESREPORT8106FINAL107.pdf. That es-
timate far exceeds the estimated $10 to $15 billion in revenue losses attributable to tax
shelters each year. See Sawicky, supra note 6, at 4-6.
306 OECD 1981 MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 140, at 11.
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proposed a framework for multilateral enforcement assistance with re-
spect to taxes.30 7 That document consciously drew on the work of the
League of Nations from the 1920s and 1940s as the OECD had previ-
ously done in producing its 1963 model double tax treaty.308 The 1981
model called on participating countries to "provide assistance to each
other in the recovery of tax claims and in the service of documents."3°9
The drafters of the convention noted that administrative assistance
had previously been addressed in its 1963 model double tax treaty,
"though in a less comprehensive way than the model conventions of
the League of Nations" 310 and noted that by the early 1980s, "tax eva-
sion ha[d] become a matter of increasing concern for governments
which have considered the issue both at a bilateral level and in interna-
tional organisations."31' The multilateral agreement was intended to
provide tax authorities with the tools necessary to operate effectively ill
an increasingly global economy.31 2
Despite the perceived urgency of its mission, the 1981 model rep-
resented a relatively small step. Unlike the London and Mexico admin-
istrative assistance drafts, it addressed only the collection of taxes al-
ready assessed. 313 The treaty that went into force in 1988, however, went
further. Rather than facilitating only the collection of taxes, it called on
signatories to "exchange any information ... that is foreseeably rele-
vant to the assessment and collection of tax, and the recovery and en-
forcement of tax claims ... "314 Nevertheless, like the 1981 draft,315 the
1988 treat), did not require the general automatic exchange of informa-
307 See id.
308 Id. at 4-5.
309 Id. at 11
310 Id. at 5.
311 OECD 1981 MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 140, at 5.
312 See id. Tax authorities perceived the need for such an agreement because "[t] he in-
crease in international movement of persons, capital, goods and services ha[d] considera-
bly widened the scope of taxpayers' noncompliance ... ." Id.
313 The 1981 model was intended to fill a gap left by the 1977 model double tax treaty.
See id. ("During the preparatory work that led to the 1977 Model Convention for the
avoidance of double taxation the Committee on Fiscal Affairs ... decided at that time just
to revise Article 26 on assistance in assessment, but to initiate work on the drafting of a
separate model convention on mutual administrative assistance in the recovery of taxes.").
314 COE/OECD 1988 Convention, supra note 295, art. 4(1).
315 The commentary to the 1981 model merely noted that "Contracting States which
wish to do so are free to provide for automatic ... exchange...." See OECD 1981 MODEL
CONVENTION, supra note 140, at 31.
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tion, and allowed parties to arrange automatic exchanges at a later
date.316
The U.S. TIEAs and the OECD multilateral convention offer two
lessons regarding extraterritorial tax information acquisition. First,
they demonstrate that the pressures that have drawn attention to the
need for improved access to extraterritorial tax information over the
last few years are not new.3 17 Second, they suggest that the time may
have come to revisit the basic assumptions that underlie eighty years
of efforts to facilitate the acquisition of extraterritorial tax informa-
tion. The weakened barter system in its current state does not provide
even the information thought necessary to enforce the income tax in
1927. In today's even more complicated world, it may be that the bar-
ter framework is itself inadequate. The OECD and tax haven TIEA
examples particularly suggest structural problems with the barter
model if neither a group as homogenous as the OECD nor relation-
ships as imbalanced as those between the United States and its tax
haven TIEA counterparties could use the framework successfully.
C. The Failure of the Barter System
In the 1920s, the income tax was not a "mass tax" but was instead
paid by a relatively small segment of the population. 318 Attitudes to-
wards taxpayer privacy were less settled than they are today.319 Esoteric
concepts such as OID lay decades into the future. 320 At the same time,
barriers to trade and currency controls imposed powerful limits on
316 The treaty provided that "[w] ith respect to categories of cases and in accordance
with procedures which they shall determine by mutual agreement, two or more Parties
shall automatically exchange ... information .... " COE/OECD 1988 Convention, supra
note 295, art 6.
317 That renewed attention is exemplified by recent U.S. and OECD efforts to establish
new Tax Information Exchange Agreements. See Zagaris, supra note 160, at 332-57.
8i8 During the interwar period, the income tax was an important feature of the fiscal
landscape but had not yet assumed the central role it would take after the Second World
War. See BROWNLEE, supra note 23, at 89, 96-97.
319 Despite good reasons to think that it would have a positive impact on tax compli-
ance, tax publicity (making summary tax data for each taxpayer public) appears to be
viewed as inconsistent with accepted standards of taxpayer privacy. See Zagaris, supra note
160, at 380-81 (arguing for stronger protections for taxpayer privacy in information ex-
change provisions). In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, it was far from clear
whether tax publicity would be acceptable. See generally Marjorie Kornhauser, Shaping Public
Opinion and the Law in the 1930s: How a "Common Man" Campaign Ended a Rich Man's Law
(Tulane Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Pa-
per No. 06-02, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=
880383 (describing history of tax publicity provisions).
320 See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 413, 83 Stat. 487, 609.
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the ability of individuals and businesses to engage in cross-border ac-
tivity.32 1 By the 1980s, when countries like the United States and or-
ganizations like the OECD began to recognize the importance of ex-
traterritorial tax information, the income tax had become a very
different animal, and the world in which income taxes are paid had
completely changed. 22 One of the consequences of those transforma-
tions is that the barter system that countries have long relied on to
acquire extraterritorial tax information does not appear to be capable
of meeting their needs. 323 In particular, countries like the United
States have seen a growing disparity between the often useful informa-
tion they are able to acquire domestically and the increasingly useless
information they acquire from abroad.3 24
For any barter system to succeed, each party must be prepared to
exchange a commodity valued by the other.325 Moreover, the legs of the
transaction must be roughly equal in value. Those limitations help to
explain why the United States felt it necessary to stretch the "informa-
tion exchange" concept by inserting what U.S. tax law generally refers
321 See Tanzi, supra note 197, at 176-77.
322 See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 296, at 8-9, 212-213; Tanzi, supra note 197, at 176-77.
323 It is certainly possible that no system of extraterritorial tax information acquisition
would fare better than information exchange. Isolated successes like the U.S.-Sweden
treaty discussed earlier are arguably largely a product of the unique historical circum-
stances in which they occurred. See supra note 263 (reviewing history leading up to U.S.-
Sweden treaty). Public choice theory suggests that extraterritorial tax acquisition efforts
will always fare relatively poorly. Given that the costs of creating a comprehensive extrater-
ritorial tax information acquisition regime would likely have fallen on a smaller group
than the costs of its domestic counterpart (i.e., only those involved in cross-border com-
merce) while the benefits would have been equally diffuse, efforts to collect extraterrito-
rial tax information should be less successful than efforts to collect domestic tax informa-
tion. See Shaviro, supra note 122, at 6-7.
324 The broad access to domestic information is illustrated by the information acquisi-
tion regimes described in Part I. See supra notes 48-130 and accompanying text. By con-
trast, the information received from abroad is less useful. See Zagaris, supra note 160, at 349
(criticizing bulk taxpayer information exchange as voluminous and often outdated); Ever-
son Letter, supra note 188, at 2 (citing lack of taxpayer identification numbers as one of
the key problems to making effective use of existing information exchange agreements).
32 See DICTIONARY OF TIHE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 29, at 33 (defining "barter").
Students of the U.S. income tax need look no further for proof than the rules governing
tax-free exchanges of business and investment property. See I.R.C. § 1031 (2000 & Supp. V
2005). If those rules did not create a great deal of flexibility by allowing taxpayers to use
"boot" to even lopsided exchanges and to use techniques such as "delayed" or "three-
cornered" exchanges, a far smaller number of "barter" transactions would qualify for the
favorable tax treatment afforded by the Internal Revenue Code. See Bradley T. Borden,
Reverse Like-Kind Exchanges: A Principled Approach, 20 VA. TAX REv. 659, 685-87 (2001) (de-
scribing flexibility in requirements for § 1031 exchange transactions).
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to as "other property" 26 in the form of unrelated tax preferences, into
the purported information swap conducted pursuant to its TIEAs. It is,
after all, obvious that the notion of an even "exchange" of information
between tax flight jurisdictions and tax havens is nothing more than a
convenient fiction.3 27 Recalling the hypothetical neighbors described
above may help to illustrate the source of the imbalance.328 Quite sim-
ply, the United States-the quintessential large, wealthy jurisdiction-
needed far more extraterritorial tax information than its neighbor.
The same basic asymmetry problem goes a long way towards ex-
plaining why the barter system for information exchange has not
proven particularly effective even among pairs and groups of relatively
similar countries. A successful swap of extraterritorial tax information
between a pair of jurisdictions would require each country to expect
roughly the same amount of benefit from the information it hopes to
receive. If their expectations are significantly different, there is a risk
that the information exchange will satisfy only the party with the lower
expectations or that no exchange will take place at all.32 The country
that expects to derive a relatively small benefit from the exchange will
be willing to devote only a relatively small amount of resources to ac-
quiring and providing information. The information-hungry partner
would be theoretically willing to devote more resources to receive more
or higher quality information, but under the barter system cannot de-
rive any additional benefit in return for those extra efforts.
The asymmetry problem is exacerbated by the requirement in ex-
isting bilateral agreements that the consideration used must not merely
be extraterritorial tax information, but reciprocal extraterritorial tax
information.330 Because of that constraint, even jurisdictions that would
326 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1031(b). The informal term for other property is "boot." See Bor-
den, supra note 325, at 716.
327 See U.N. Tax Experts Report, supra note 300, 52 (noting the insignificance of in-
formation received from tax flight jurisdictions by tax havens).
328 See supra notes 196-205 and accompanying text.
329 For example, if one country expects to increase its tax revenues by $100 million by
receiving information from a potential information exchange partner that would cost $10
million to generate, while the partner might only increase its revenues by a few million
dollars if it received extraterritorial tax information from the first country, the information
exchange might not take place if tax information is the only permissible consideration.
330 The "reciprocal" requirement further restricts the consideration that may be used
to acquire information that is useful to each jurisdiction and that each jurisdiction can
supply. See, e.g., 2005 OECD COMMENTARY, supra note 283, art 26 1 18 (noting that "if the
structure of the information systems of two Contracting States is very different, the condi-
tions under [paragraph 3 of Article 26 of the 2005 Model OECD Convention] will lead to
the result that the Contracting States exchange very little information or perhaps none at
all."); see also 1927 Report, supra note 16, at 24 ("First of all [assistance] must be reciprocal,
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place an identical value on their desired extraterritorial tax informa-
tion might be unable to reach a fully satisfactory arrangement. If the
extraterritorial tax information each needs is significantly different,
they will only be able to agree to exchange those limited items of in-
formation that they both need and have the capacity to provide.331 If
one country depends heavily on ex ante information reporting while
another relies on ex post information, the former might prefer to re-
ceive a steady stream of information automatically while the latter
might prefer simply having access to information on an as-needed ba-
sis. The reciprocity requirement could easily block the creation of such
an arrangement.
Fortunately, the use of a barter regime for extraterritorial tax in-
formation acquisition is not the only possible approach. The recent
European Union Savings Directive (the "Directive") illustrates one pos-
sible alternative.3 32 The Directive leverages the supranational bureauc-
racy of the European Union to compel members to provide ex ante
information to one another.333 But because governments use extraterri-
torial tax information to generate tax revenue, creating a supranational
tax authority is not the only alternative to the use of the dominant bar-
ter model. If a given country could estimate the benefits it expects to
derive from the receipt of extraterritorial tax information from a po-
tential partner, it would be able to put a price tag on that informa-
tion. 33 4 Even if the government in possession of, or at least with access
that is to say, States will be bound to afford each other assistance only under identical con-
ditions; in other words, subject to any provision to the contrary, a country will only be enti-
tled to demand information of a kind which it is itself in a position to supply.").
331 This dynamic could help to explain why it is easier to reach agreement on providing
tax information on request than it is to reach agreement with respect to automatic exchange
of information. The 1988 OECD treaty, for example, encouraged, but did not require, auto-
matic exchanges of information. See COE/OECD 1988 Convention, supra note 295, art 6. It
could also explain why "most of the existing [U.S.-tax haven] agreements are restricted only
to criminal matters." Guttentag & Avi-Yonah, supra note 157, at 105. Criminal matters may be
the only context in which U.S. and tax haven interests are aligned.
332 Council Directive 2003/48, 2003 O.J. (L 157) 38 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= OJ:L:2003:157:0038:0048:EN:PDF (amended
by Council Directive 2004/66, 2004 O.J. (L 168); Council Directive 2004/587, 2004 O.J. (L
257) 7 (EC); Council Directive 2006/98, 2006 O.J. (L 363) 129 (EC)).
s3 See Cathy Phillips, The EU Savings Tax Directive: A Work in Progress, 42 TAX No-rEs
INT'L 1011, 1013 (2006).
33 In the domestic context, such revenue estimates are conducted as a matter of course
when tax policy changes are being considered. The Office of Tax Analysis within the U.S.
Treasury Department has a Revenue Estimating Division that "estimates the revenue conse-
quences of all the Administration's legislative tax proposals and major Congressional tax
proposals." U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Office of Tax Policy, Divisions of the Office of Tax
Analysis, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/offices/otadiisions.shtml (last visited
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to, the sought-after extraterritorial tax information had no need for
reciprocal extraterritorial tax information, it might be willing to sell
that information for cash.
Put differently, might the global market for extraterritorial tax in-
formation function more effectively if it were more complete? If we as-
stme that each country's extraterritorial tax information needs are
unique, it stands to reason that eliminating (1) the requirement that
information exchange be reciprocal3 35 and (2) the implicit prohibition
on using consideration other than extraterritorial tax information 336
would increase the likelihood that countries will succeed in acquiring
the extraterritorial tax information they need. On the other hand, the
problem may not be too little market, but too much. Perhaps pursuing
an alternative, nonmarket approach, such as modifying tax systems to
reduce the need for extraterritorial tax information or creating a trans-
national quasi-governmental body capable of maintaining and enforc-
ing a system to ensure that each government receives the information it
needs, would be preferable. The next Part describes several options
and compares the costs and benefits of either creating a more complete
market or of eliminating the need for a market in extraterritorial tax
information.
IV. A MORE COMPLETE MARKET OR No MARKET AT ALL?
Given how inadequate the practice of information exchange has
proven, it is somewhat surprising that the concept has retained such a
strong appeal for scholars337 and policyrnakers. 38 The reason for its
Feb. 28, 2008). Separately, the nonpartisan, congressional Joint Committee on Taxation pro-
,ides the official revenue estimates of all tax legislation that is considered by Congress. U.S.
Congress Joint Comm. on Taxation, Joint Committee Revenue Estimation Process, http://
www.house.gov/jct/revhist.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2008). Individual members of Congress
may make requests for revenue estimates of particular tax proposals. Id.
335 See U.S. 2006 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26; U.N. 2001 Model Conven-
tion, supra note 16, art. 26; OECD 2005 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26.
336 See supra note 240 and accompanying text. One important respect in which the in-
formation exchange provision of a bilateral double tax treaty is different from a stand-alone
agreement is that the double tax treaty creates more opportunities for horse-trading, effec-
tively loosening the reciprocality constraint. Even if each provision of a treaty is reciprocal, it
seems likely that some provisions would provide more benefit to one treaty partner than to
the other. Obviously, the flexibility the opportunity to trade provisions creates is not unlim-
ited.
a37 See, e.g., Guttentag & Avi-Yonah, supra note 157, at 106 (advocating continued ef-
forts to expand the network of "bilateral information exchange agreements based on the
OECD model").
338 See Zagaris, supra note 160, at 332-57 (discussing recent efforts to establish new
TIEAs).
2008l
Boston College Law Review
longevity may simply be path dependence, 339 a product of the coattails
of its more successful sibling (the double tax treaty), 340 or something
else entirely. Whatever the explanation, it may finally be time to turn
away decisively from information exchange. This Part begins by laying
out three strategies for improving the fit between countries' needs for
extraterritorial tax information and their ability to acquire it.341 It then
evaluates those possible approaches by considering their impact on ag-
gregate social welfare, their distributional implications, and their likely
effect on privacy and information control.3 42
A. Closing the Extraterritoial Tax Information Deficit
The basic choice confronted by countries without access to the ex-
traterritorial tax information they need is a simple one. Countries can
either work to create a more complete market for extraterritorial tax
information or they can choose to reduce their reliance on that market.
This Section focuses on the practical implications of that choice.343 It
first sketches out the broad outlines of a more complete market for ex-
traterritorial tax information and then explores two nonmarket alterna-
tives.344
1. A More Complete Market
When U.S. tax authorities collect tax information domestically,
they have broad authority but are still subject to meaningful con-
straints.3 45 Of course, those constraints are different from those they
encounter in collecting extraterritorial tax information.346 They possess
the authority to demand virtually any tax information from private par-
ties without the need to provide compensation.3 47 Still, political realities
limit their ability to acquire any and all information that might be help-
339 See supra notes 206-336 and accompanying text (tracing development of informa-
tion exchange provisions).
340 See Graetz, supra note 216, at 1358 (estimating the existence of more than 1700 bi-
lateral double tax treaties).
341 See infra notes 345-377 and accompanying text.
342 See infra notes 378-411 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 345-377 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 345-377 and accompanying text.
35 See Brown, supra note 124, at 807 (discussing end of TCMP due to political pres-
sures).
346 See Tillinghast, supra note 8, at 39, 51.
-7 See I.R.C. §§ 7601-7613 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007) (authorizing various investigative
and enforcement powers of IRS including summons and power to execute search and
arrest warrants, among others).
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ful.3 48 When policymakers designed the systems to acquire OlD and tax
shelter information discussed above, 349 for example, they had to decide
precisely what information was absolutely necessary and who should
supply it. The goal was not to collect the greatest amount of informa-
tion possible, but rather the smallest amount that would facilitate the
necessary observation.
These same choices would need to be made if tax authorities were
purchasing information from other tax authorities (and indirectly from
private parties within each foreign jurisdiction),350 If U.S. tax authorities
were to bargain with foreign governments for the right to receive in-
formation with respect to income earned by U.S. taxpayers, for exam-
ple, through foreign corporations treated as QEFs, 51 the U.S. authori-
ties would need to decide what information to acquire and from whom.
Having identified those jurisdictions in which U.S. taxpayers earn sig-
nificant quantities of QEF income (or OID income or any other income
U.S. taxpayers earn in significant amounts overseas), the United States
could negotiate with the governments of those jurisdictions regarding
the specific nature of the information each might be willing to provide,
and, if necessary, acquire, as well as regarding the price at which it
would be willing and able to provide it.
Each such negotiation would be conducted against the back-
ground of the administrative capacity and privacy constraints of the
host states. The tax authorities of some of those states might already
collect much of the information in question and have the ability to eas-
ily provide precisely the information sought. Others might be bound by
stringent privacy laws that would prevent the wholesale disclosure of
information, but might nevertheless be able to work with U.S. authori-
ties to create a system that would identify potential compliance fail-
ures.35 2 The negotiated price would likely include both an amount that
348 For example, eliminating the "book/tax" prong of the reportable transaction defi-
nition, see supra note 80, may have been justified as a policy matter, but also may have re-
sulted in part from pressure to ensure that the rules imposed as few burdens on taxpayers
and their advisors as was possible. Likewise, the demise and rebirth of the TCMP, see supra
notes 124-125, illustrate the sensitivity of tax authorities to political pressures. See also
Blum, supra note 25, at 629 (noting that countries' taxation decisions require consensus
about the services the government provides and their distribution).
349 See supra notes 59-85 and accompanying text.
350 A different, more radical approach would be to purchase the necessary information
from private actors, including foreign businesses and banks.
351 See supra notes 201-204.
352 Rather than simply creating a one-way flow of information, it might be necessary
for U.S. authorities to provide information to the QEF host jurisdiction which could then
compare it to information in its possession for discrepancies, which it could bring to the
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would compensate private parties, such as the QEFs themselves, for ex-
penses they incur, and a component intended to offset the burdens
imposed on the participating foreign governments.
Although a useful illustration of the sort of ex ante information
that could be acquired, third-party information with respect to QEF
income earned by U.S. taxpayers is almost certainly not the most ur-
gent priority for U.S. tax authorities. s53 It is also undoubtedly true that
the tax laws of many other jurisdictions have no concept even re-
motely similar to the QEF and would have nothing to gain from a re-
ciprocal effort to acquire that information.3 54 Even if this information
was neither a priority nor a reciprocal need, so long as an initiative to
purchase that information could generate enough tax revenue to
more than pay for the cost of its acquisition, such an effort could be
worthwhile.
The wide variation among national tax systems would make it in-
evitable that each country would benefit from a different mix of extra-
territorial tax information.3 55 Take, for example, the pair of hypotheti-
cal neighboring countries described above.3 56 The smaller of the two
would need consumption- rather than income-related extraterritorial
tax information and would be less likely to need it on an ex ante ba-
sis.3 57 Others that impose taxes on wages and, unlike the United States
do not exempt wages earned overseas,358 might benefit from receiving
third-party reports regarding taxpayers employed overseas. For some
countries, there might not be any extraterritorial tax information that
attention of U.S. tax authorities. Such an arrangement could help the United States
achieve its enforcement objectives while allowing the foreign jurisdiction to maintain the
integrity of its privacy laws.
353 International tax shelters, for example, might be a higher priority. The United States
has begun cooperating with other countries in just such an effort to combat international tax
shelters. See Joint International Tax Shelter Information Centre Memorandum of Under-
standing, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/jitsic-ftnalmou.pdf (last visited Feb. 27,
2008).
354 See Kimberly S. Blanchard, Cross-Border Tax Problems of Investment Funds, 60 TAx LAw.
583, 593 (2007) (noting very few other countries utilize QEF election regime).
355 See Ring, supra note 65. at 88-89 (discussing variation in international tax rules).
356 See supra notes 196-205 and accompanying text.
35 It is interesting to consider exactly what extraterritorial tax information countries
that rely heavily on import taxes might find helpful in taxing overseas purchases by resi-
dents. Credit card information with respect to foreign purchases would be helpful, but it is
unclear whether countries would be willing to collect and supply that information to other
nations.
-8 See I.R.C. § 911 (West Supp. IV 2008) (amended by Pub. L. No. 110-172, 121 Stat.
2476 (2007)) (allowing U.S. citizens to earn a certain amount and type of income without
being subject to U.S. tax).
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would be worth its cost. As a result, an optimal flow of extraterritorial
tax information would likely be highly asymmetric, both in content and
in volume. This asymmetry clearly contrasts with the current informa-
tion exchange mandate in existing agreements.3 59
2. Nonmarket Approaches
Even if the incomplete global market for tax information leaves
much to be desired, it does not necessarily follow that a more complete
market presents the most appealing alternative. If, for example, the
original arguments in favor of a market model, such as the "risk of" a
more centralized, bureaucratic approach "appearing in some quarters
as an extension beyond national frontiers of an organized system of
fiscal inquisition" 360 are no longer the most compelling, a market ap-
proach may no longer be justified. Particularly if market failures, such
as bilateral monopoly,3 61 would impede the emergence of a robust
market, it may be that moving further from a market framework might
offer more benefits at less cost. The following discussion will consider
two strategies that could help to close the extraterritorial tax informa-
tion deficit by either improving the cross-border flow of extraterritorial
tax information without relying on market principles or by decreasing
the need for extraterritorial tax information.
The first possibility involves the creation of a transnational body
with the power to overcome the jurisdictional problems that prevent
individual governments from acquiring extraterritorial tax information
unilaterally.362 Such an intergovernmental actor could have power to
acquire extraterritorial tax information on par with the domestic capac-
ity of national tax authorities to acquire tax information. The second
potential strategy would instead target the demand for extraterritorial
tax information rather than its supply by consciously redesigning na-
tional tax systems to limit the need for extraterritorial tax information.
In recent years, two existing intergovernmental organizations, the
United Nations (the "U.N.") and the OECD, have become leading con-
359 See U.S. 2006 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26; U.N. 2001 Model Conven-
tion, supra note 16, art. 26; OECD 2005 Model Convention, supra note 16, art. 26.
360 1927 Report, supra note 16, at 23.
361 See RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.8 (6th ed. 2003) (describ-
ing impact of bilateral monopoly on the ability of parties to strike what would be a mutu-
ally beneficial bargain). Judge Posner notes that bilateral monopoly is characterized by the
fact that "neither party has good alternatives to dealing with the other." Id. This situation
results in high transaction costs. Id.
3 See supra notes 168-195 and accompanying text.
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tenders for the mantle of "World Tax Organization." 363 In part, that is a
function of actiNities each has conducted to advance the goal of greater
international tax cooperation. 364 Both the OECD and the U.N. have a
long history of involvement in international tax matters. 365 First the
OECD and later the U.N. published model double tax treaties based on
the older League of Nations models.366 In more recent years, they have
both worked to address the extraterritorial tax information deficit. The
OECD first published a report on what it termed "harmful tax competi-
tion" in 1998 and has followed on that effort by initiating a new wave of
information exchange agreements. 367 In the last few years, the U.N.
Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters368
has asserted the U.N.'s claim as the more legitimate authority on mat-
ters of international tax cooperation. 369
In theory, such an organization would be able to fill the gap that
lies at the heart of the extraterritorial tax information problem. Rather
363 Vito Tanzi was one of the first to address the desirability and potential role of a
World Tax Organization. See generally Tanzi, supra note 197.
36 See, e.g., U.N. Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and Devel-
oping Countries, U.N. Doc. No. ST/ESA/102 (1980) [hereinafter U.N. Double Taxation
Convention], reprinted in 5 STANLEY S. SURREY, SELECTED MONOGRAPHS ON TAXATION 87-
113 (1980); OECD Double Taxation Draft, supra note 16.
365 See, e.g., U.N. Double Taxation Convention, supra note 364, at 87-113; OECD Dou-
ble Taxation Draft, supra note 16.
366 See, e.g., U.N. Double Taxation Convention, supra note 364, at 87-113; OECD Dou-
ble Taxation Draft, supra note 16.
367 See Zagaris, supra note 160, at 332-57 (discussing recent efforts to establish new
TIEAs). See generally 1998 OECD REPORT, supra note 18.
36 This is the same committee formerly known as the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on In-
ternational Cooperation in Tax Matters. See U.N. Fin. for Dev., Overview of the Committee
of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/
overview.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2008).
369 See Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Int'l Cooperation in Tax Matters, Institutional
Framework for International Tax Cooperation, 1 5-10, U.N. Doc. ST/SG/AC.8/2003/L.6
(Aug. 19, 2003), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N03/481/35/
PDF/N0348135.pdf?OpenElement ("The major industrialized countries have addressed
their concerns about international taxation under the auspices of the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).... The United Nations has recog-
nized for some time the need to give the developing and transitional countries a voice in
the formulation of international tax norms."). The OECD's limited membership has thus
raised questions about its legitimacy. See Arthur J. Cockfield, The Rise of the OECD as Infor-
mal "World Tax Organization" Through National Responses to E-Commerce Tax Challenges, 8 YALE
J.L. & TECH. 136, 175-86 (2006); Michael Littlewood, Tax Competition: Harmful to Whom?, 26
MICH. J. INT'L L. 411, 480-85 (2004). The problem proved particularly vexing in the con-
text of its antiharmful tax competition initiative, which to some looked like a group of
large, wealthy countries bullying smaller ones. See Alexander Townsend, Jr., Comment, The
Global Schoolyard Bully: The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development's Coercive
Efforts to Control Tax Competition, 25 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 215, 251-58 (2001).
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than creating a patchwork bilateral solution, it would replicate on a
global scale the system the European Union is working to create within
Europe, in which a central authority possesses the power to compel the
production of tax information and to punish noncompliance. Unfor-
tunately, there is no international organization that appears capable of
serving as the linchpin of such a regime.370
To this point, the discussion has focused exclusively on finding
ways of improving access to extraterritorial tax information. A very dif-
ferent, and conceivably more productive, take on the problem might
instead be to work to produce tax systems that consume less of it.371 Al-
though it is difficult to conceive of a tax system that would require abso-
lutely no extraterritorial tax information, 372 some will inevitably require
more than others. Even relatively minor alterations in tax rules, such as
foreign income exclusions, could dramatically reduce the amount of
extraterritorial tax information authorities need to monitor compli-
ance.373 For example, one provision of the Internal Revenue Code
permits U.S. taxpayers working abroad to exclude the first $85,700 of
earned income.3 74 There are certainly other policy justifications for the
rule, but one practical implication of the exclusion is that a large num-
ber of U.S. taxpayers do not have to report any of their earned income,
thereby relieving tax authorities of the obligation to verify the amount
of income reported.37 5
370 On the one hand, the OECD probably comes the closest to having the power to
form such an arrangement, but with its membership made up exclusively of large, wealthy
countries, it lacks the necessary legitimacy. See Littlewood, supra note 369, at 480-85. On
the other hand, the U.N. may have sufficient legitimacy but probably lacks the power to
enforce such a regime. Hathaway, supra note 303, at 506, (observing that the U.N.'s en-
forcement authority is weak); Littlewood, supra note 369, at 480-85. At least in the United
States, resistance to the creation of such an entity would be significant. See, e.g., Daniel
Mitchell, U.N. Tax Police PotentiaL WASH. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2002, at A18.
371 See Tillinghast, supra note 8, at 38 (noting that "[t] here is considerable scope for
simplifying the international aspects of the tax law, and this would clearly make the IRS's
job easier").
372 A pure territorial tax system might come closest. It seems unlikely, however, that
even such a system would require no extraterritorial tax information. Even under current
law, it is the allocation of income and deductions between U.S. sources and foreign sources
that is the most troublesome. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8 (as amended in 2006) (requir-
ing information about both foreign and domestic activities of taxpayers to determine how
to allocate deductions).
373 See I.R.C. § 911 (West Supp. IV 2008) (amended by Pub. L. No. 110-72, 121 Stat.
2476 (2007)).
374 Id. The amount currently excludable, as adjusted for inflation, is provided by Sec-
tion 3.30 of I.R.S. Rev. Proc. 2006-51, I.R.B. 2006-48.
37 See I.R.C. § 911.
20081
Boston College Law Review
Unfortunately, the cross-border implications of such changes are
only some of the many important policy considerations that must be
taken into account. Even if it were possible to create a tax system that is
significantly more efficient with respect to extraterritorial tax informa-
tion, that system might fall short on other grounds. The best illustra-
tion of this may be the taxation of income derived from capital. Be-
cause that income is particularly mobile, it is also unusually elusive
from tax authorities' perspective.3 76 Abandoning efforts to tax that in-
come would eliminate the need for a great deal of extraterritorial tax
information. Such a change, however, could also produce a dramatic,
and potentially undesirable, shift in tax burdens.3 77
B. Evaluating the Alternatives
The previous Section described three strategies for reducing the
disparity between the amount of extraterritorial tax information gov-
ernments collect and the amount they need to enforce their tax regimes
successfully. This Section assesses their relative normative merits.3 78 It
does so by focusing on three separate considerations. First, it examines
their impact on aggregate social welfare. Second, it evaluates the distri-
butional effects each approach would be likely to produce. Third, it
weighs the potential consequences of each strategy for taxpayers' pri-
vacy.
1. Social Welfare
The least desirable approach from the perspective of aggregate
welfare 379 would almost certainly be to implement a tax system specifi-
376 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 162, at 1575-77.
377 See id. at 1576.
378 A very different question would be which approach would be the most likely to
produce the desired result. Although it would be nice to assume that governments can be
counted on to pursue the most normatively desirable course of action, that is no more
likely to be true with respect to international tax cooperation than it is for domestic tax
policy. See Dean, supra note 35, at 921-23. As Oona Hathaway has explained, it is possible
to categorize and compare the pressures that might cause countries to both adopt and
actually comply with cooperative international arrangements. See generally Hathaway, supra
note 303.
379 By using the terms social welfare and aggregate welfare, this Article intends to refer
to the framework that welfare economists use for "evaluating the different choices that
society may make. Under the framework, the social evaluation of a situation consists of two
elements: first, determination of the utility of each individual in the situation, and second,
amalgamation of individuals' utilities in some way." STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF
EcONOMic ANALYSIS oF LAW 595-96 (2004).
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cally designed to consume only a very small amount of extraterritorial
tax information. That is because such a system would inevitably sacrifice
economic efficiency in the name of information efficiency. Assuming
that the same total amount of tax revenue would be collected using a
narrower tax base, the rates applicable to the narrower base would be
higher. Those higher rates would be more likely to influence taxpayers'
behavior, creating a larger wedge between the choices a given taxpayer
would make in a world with and without taxes. The narrower base
would give taxpayers both a greater incentive and more opportunities
to engage in wasteful tax planning.38°
On the other hand, creating an intergovernmental tax organiza-
tion could produce a positive outcome. Ideally by making sound
choices regarding both what information should be collected and how
to collect it, such an organization would help to close the extraterrito-
rial tax information deficit without distorting taxpayers' behavior.38 ' For
example, by creating a uniform, worldwide system of providing and re-
ceiving extraterritorial tax information, it would limit taxpayers' ability
to engage in tax flight by camouflaging their income.38 2 Unfortunately,
that uniformity would also be a detriment. Such an organization would
need to build a broad consensus to function effectively. The one-size-
fits-all solution likely to emerge from such a process might not ade-
quately address the differing needs and concerns of the diverse group
of countries involved. 383
Developing a more complete market, by contrast, would offer the
benefits that come along with decentralization, including providing
individual countries with greater freedom to design an optimal tax sys-
tem. For example, rather than being compelled to move towards a nar-
rower tax base with higher rates, improving access to extraterritorial tax
information would permit countries to maintain a broader base by tax-
ing activities that might otherwise have been impractical. 384 By eliminat-
3m By simultaneously refraining from taxing one activity and taxing another more
heavily, such an approach would encourage taxpayers to substitute more of the first activity
in place of the second, even if the second were a more attractive option on a pretax basis.
31 See supra notes 168-195 and accompanying text (reviewing limitations of current
tax information system).
82 See supra notes 157-167 and accompanying text (addressing tax flight).
3 See supra notes 196-205 and accompanying text (discussing variety in countries' ex-
traterritorial tax information needs).
3 The flipside of that flexibility would be the obligation to internalize the costs of
producing the necessary extraterritorial tax information. That obligation would not pre-
vent a country from creating a tax system that consumes a great deal of extraterritorial tax
information, but could make it expensive to do so. One could argue that such liberty is
illusory since only relatively wealthy countries could afford to purchase extraterritorial tax
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ing the need for a universal consensus created by international conven-
tions or a supranational organization, a more flexible market approach
would also create space for innovation and change. 38 As compared to
either a demand-oriented or intergovernmental organization ap-
proach, a more complete market seems likely to produce the most de-
sirable results in terms of its aggregate impact on welfare. 386
2. Distributional Impact
Reducing the need for extraterritorial tax information seems likely
to have mixed results in terms of its distributional impact. At the inter-
national level the distributional effects of a demand-oriented approach
might be positive. If relatively wealthy countries consune a dispropor-
tionate amount of extraterritorial tax information, redirecting the re-
sources and energy currently devoted to increasing access to that in-
formation toward problems of more relevance to poorer countries
might ultimately leave those poor countries better off. At the subna-
tional level, however, a narrow tax base would produce a tax system that
favors some groups over others. If that narrow base is chosen specifi-
cally because it limits the need for extraterritorial tax information, it
would tend to harm those taxpayers least likely to earn geographically
mobile income or to engage in cross-border economic activity.38 7 For
example, eliminating taxes on income derived from capital would re-
duce the need for extraterritorial tax information but would shift the
tax burden towards less geographically mobile income such as wage
income, potentially making the tax system more regressive.Ass
information that would not "pay for itself" by producing a substantial increase in revenues.
It is not clear, however, that such a system would cause poor countries to receive less useful
extraterritorial tax information than they currently receive.
385 In other words, when arrangements involve two parties rather than dozens, it
should be easier to correct flaws and to make improvements. Identifying those improve-
ments would also be easier with a deeper pool of examples to use as models.
38 An important caveat is that such a system would only produce the desired result if,
and only if, national governments can be trusted to act in manner that reflects the true
interests of their respective populations. With cash as a medium of exchange, a country
deciding whether to cooperate in providing information would need to, for example,
weigh the value of strict privacy protections against the value of whatever services or bene-
fits the cash payment could allow it to provide. If a government miscalculates its relative
values or intentionally undervalues one or the other it might strike a bad bargain from the
perspective of national welfare.
387 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 162, at 1575-77 (discussing regressive effect of increas-
ingly taxing labor compared with capital because capital is increasingly mobile).
3w See id.
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In theory, an intergovernmental organization could achieve a
highly desirable distributional result at both the subnational and inter-
national levels. By deciding both what information should be collected
and how the economic costs associated with collecting it should .be al-
located, the organization could ensure that the net benefits of better
information sharing are apportioned fairly. Here, the difficulty would
be determining what would constitute a fair distribution. Rich and poor
countries are likely to disagree on who should finance the operation of
the organization. 389 If different countries would benefit disproportion-
ately from access to different sorts of information, choosing which in-
formation to target in effect could determine the allocation of benefits.
It might be optimistic to think that even an organization like the U.N.
has the capacity to strike a balance that each country would perceive to
be fair.
A more complete market might succeed in creating distributional
balance without the need for the centralized decision-making capacity
of an intergovernmental organization. In effect, requiring consumers
of extraterritorial tax information to purchase that information would
cause them to internalize enforcement costs inherent in their chosen
tax regime.390 If they decide those costs are too high, they would be free
to pursue alternative enforcement strategies or to modify their tax sys-
tems to reduce the need for extraterritorial tax information. Likewise,
sellers would agree to provide extraterritorial tax information only if
they find the price offered for that information to be fair. Although a
market solution might seem likely to favor the wealthy, when compared
with a world in which rich countries compel3 91 poor countries to pro-
vide them with a significant amount of extraterritorial tax information
without paying for it, the distributional consequences of creating a
more complete market are relatively appealing. 392
Either a more complete market or a successful supranational effort
would have positive distributional effects within each country, because
either would result in greater access to extraterritorial tax information.
Conversely, strategies to limit demand would likely have negative distri-
*a A rich country might prefer a per-capita funding obligation. A poor country would
likely insist on a system based on GDP or some other measure of wealth.
390 See Ayres & Funk, supra note 1, at 83-85 (discussing consequences of failure to in-
ternalize costs in the telemarketing context).
391 That compulsion could be achieved with the threat of sanctions imposed unilater-
ally or through intergovernmental organizations primarily representing the interests of
wealthy countries. See Guttentag & Avi-Yonah, supra note 157, at 107 (suggesting possible
sanctions against "non-cooperating tax havens").
392 See Townsend, supra note 369, at 251-58.
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butional consequences at the national level. By fostering improved en-
forcement and a modest amount of base-broadening, 393 better informa-
tion access could help to ensure that tax systems are as progressive,
both nominally and in real terms, as each country desires.
3. Privacy
Although it does not get high marks for its welfare or distribu-
tional impact, a demand-oriented approach becomes significantly more
appealing when privacy interests are granted a privileged status. If we
conceive of the protection of taxpayers' "personal data ... as a funda-
mental civil liberty interest, essential to individual autonomy, dignity,
and freedom in a democratic civil society," 94 rather than simply a mat-
ter of personal preference, it might never be appropriate for a govern-
ment to exchange or sell that information. 395 From that point of view,
limiting information flows would be highly desirable.3 96 Nevertheless,
impeding data commodification without simultaneously reducing the
need for extraterritorial tax information would only worsen the infor-
mation deficit already hobbling tax authorities' enforcement efforts.
If it were possible to find a perfect balance between protecting
information and providing access for tax authorities, an organization
like the OECD or U.N. could be ideally positioned to identify it. A
policy body able to formulate a distinction between tax-related infor-
mation that a government never should provide to another and less
sensitive information that a government might transfer could pave
the way toward alleviating privacy concerns that currently impede the
flow of extraterritorial tax information. 397 Alternatively, such an or-
-99 Lack of access to extraterritorial tax information is only part of what makes it diffi-
cult to maintain a broad tax base that includes geographically mobile income such as capi-
tal income. Tax rate competition could still inhibit efforts to tax mobile income. See 1998
OECD REPORT, supra note 18, at 26.
394 Pamela Samuelson, Plivacy as Intellectual Property ?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1125, 1128 (2000).
395 For some, the mere existence of markets in personal data is objectionable. See, e.g.,
Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. Rv. 1283, 1301 (2000)
("The market in personal data is the problem. Market solutions [to data privacy failures]
based on a property rights model won't cure it; they'll only legitimize it."). Put differently,
the question is whether governments should be able to sell personal information, includ-
ing social security numbers and other personal details, even if private parties are not per-
mitted to do so.
396 See id.
397 See Blum, supra note 25, at 623-33 (discussing privacy concerns particularly relevant
to extraterritorial tax information); Zagaris, supra note 160, at 379-83 (discussing need for
incorporation of taxpayers' rights, including privacy, into international taxation enforce-
ment).
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ganization's resources and expertise could allow it to play a key role in
devising a more unconventional solution that could simultaneously
increase privacy protections and enforcement capacities. 3 98
Because attitudes towards privacy, however, like the needs of dif-
ferent tax systems for extraterritorial tax information, vary significantly,
it seems unlikely that there is just one answer to the question of how, or
indeed whether, to protect taxpayers' privacy.399 A market that is more
flexible than the current one could allow each country to establish its
own limits. 40 Conceivably, an exporting country that is unwilling to sell
unprocessed, bulk information might be willing to provide information
that, although still ex ante information, has been filtered to reduce the
likelihood that selling the information will harm innocent taxpayers'
privacy in terests.40 1
Of course, the same flexibility that is the strength of a more com-
plete market could also make it vulnerable to criticism. Complaints that
are commonly leveled at markets that stray close to issues of personal
autonomy could have considerable force in this context.40 2 Poor coun-
tries might not be able to afford the same level of privacy protection as
wealthier countries. 40 3 That could create the possibility of relatively rich
countries enjoying both adequate extraterritorial tax information and
ample privacy protections for its own information while other countries
have neither. Although today's incomplete market for extraterritorial
398 An example of such a solution might be creating an independent body that would
collect tax information from participating countries and act as a clearinghouse or "data
aggregator" to identify and highlight potential reporting failures, without providing in-
formation with respect to compliant taxpayers to foreign governments.
399 See Samuelson, supra note 394, at 1142 (noting that the concept of information pri-
vacy as a civil right is dominant in Europe). In the United States we have become quite
comfortable with the idea that information about our income is semipublic. See Blum,
supra note 25, at 623 (observing that the U.S. tax system is essentially incompatible with
information disclosure on solely an investigative basis). Residents of a jurisdiction without
an income tax might feel differently and view governmental monitoring of the amount
and sources of their income as "snooping." By the same token, U.S. taxpayers might object
to having information about their purchases reported to jurisdictions they might have
visited that happen to employ a consumption-based tax.
400 See Samuelson, supra note 394, at 1142.
401 Whether that processed information fetches a higher or lower price would pre-
sumably depend on whether the screening method makes the information more or less
useful to the recipient.
402 See Ronald A. Cass, Coping with Life, Law, and Markets: A Comment on Posner and the
Law-and-Economics Debate, 67 B.U. L. REv. 73, 75-77 (1987) (listing four categories of objec-
tions to applying a market framework in the adoption context).
403 Cass would consider this a "consequentialist-internal" objection, as it relates to un-
desirable practical effects on the parties to the "transaction" in question. See id. at 75.
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tax information raises similar questions, 4°4 a market in which cash is
permitted to change hands in exchange for extraterritorial tax infor-
mation could put even greater pressure on countries to sacrifice privacy
to advance other legitimate government objectives.
C. A Better Market
As the above discussion demonstrates, strong arguments can be
made in favor of abandoning the market for extraterritorial tax infor-
mation entirely and in favor of eliminating the constraints that prevent
desirable transactions from taking place. On the one hand, creating a
more complete market for tax information, primarily by allowing the
use of consideration other than reciprocal extraterritorial tax informa-
tion, offers the greatest potential benefit in social welfare terms and
also seems the most plausible route to satisfying distributional results.
On the other hand, the two nonmarket approaches could do the most
to protect taxpayers' privacy
Which approach best suits any given country would depend on its
unique needs and circumstances. If the United States, for example, were
determined to improve its capacity to acquire extraterritorial tax infor-
mation, unilaterally moving away from a rigid information exchange
approach in favor of a more adaptable market model could help to
achieve that goal. Building a broad consensus that such a profound
transformation is both warranted and wise would obviously not hurt, but
any pair of countries that can be persuaded that such an arrangement
would leave each of them better off could enter into an agreement even
if no such consensus existed.
One further advantage of a more complete market could be the
power it would grant to participating countries to monitor compliance
and to punish noncompliance. 405 A carefully crafted agreement be-
tween countries would make it relatively easy for each to determine
whether a counterparty is adhering to both the letter and the spirit of
the bargain. 4° 6 Likewise, by withholding future payments or informa-
404 The fundamental premise of the modern information exchange agreement is that
a country will consent to provide information in exchange for information that it can use
to enforce its tax rules. A poor country could well agree to trade information it would
prefer to protect in order to raise tax revenues, effectively selling the information for cash.
405 See Hathaway, supra note 303, at 514.
406 For example, because the 1939 U.S.-Sweden Treaty clearly specified what was to be
provided and when it was required to be provided, it would be much easier to determine
whether the United States were fulfilling the information exchange provisions of the 1939
U.S.-Sweden treaty, than the very general requirements of the 2006 model. Compare U.S.-
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tion transfers they would be able to unilaterally punish breaches. 4 7 In
effect, such agreements would fill the gap left by the absence of a well-
functioning supranational bureaucracy (such as the World Trade Or-
ganization). The resulting improvements in both worldwide and na-
tional welfare would tend to make any such agreement stable over the
long term.4°8
At the same time, the nonmarket approaches could serve as a
complement to a more complete market. Even while the strictures of
the current barter regime are loosened, individual countries could
work to reduce their reliance on extraterritorial tax information while
intergovernmental organizations develop standards regarding the types
of information that should never be bought and sold. Obviously, the
market itself would provide a natural incentive for governments to do
the former. The less information a country needs, the less information
it must purchase. Banning specific types of transactions or practices
would, by contrast, probably require affirmative intervention by an or-
ganization like the U.N. or the OECD. 4°9 That intervention would be
most appropriate in situations in which the market (i.e., governments)
would be likely to put too low a price on a given type of extraterritorial
tax information. 410
The resulting market would be considerably more flexible than
the current one. As in today's barter market, however, not every theo-
retically possible transaction will be allowed to occur. The difference
from the current regime lies in the reason those deals would not be
permitted. Now, potential exchanges go unconsummated simply be-
cause a reciprocal barter exchange is impossible to arrange.411 Whether
Sweden 1939 Treaty, supra note 210, art. XVI, with U.S. 2006 Model Convention, supra note
16, art. 26.
407 This would create what Hathaway refers to as transnational legal enforcement, a key
element in any successful international cooperative arrangement. See Hathaway, supra note
303, at 514. Hathaway concludes that "empirical evidence supports the integrated theory's
prediction that where transnational legal enforcement is weak, states will be more likely to
commit to and less likely to comply with treaties." Id. at 519.
408 See Daniel Shaviro, Why Worldwide Welfare as a Normative Standard in U.S. Tax Policy,
60 TAx L. Rrv. 155, 178 (2007) (concluding improvements in worldwide welfare play an
important role in maintaining the stability of the international tax regime and in promot-
ing national welfare).
409 See, e.g., Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (1981), available at http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/en/Treaties/Word/108.doc.
410 In some cases, any price may be too low. That, of course, is just another way of say-
ing that the sought-after information should never be the subject of a market transaction,
even one between governments.
411 See supra notes 318-336 and accompanying text (discussing failures of barter system).
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that obstacle prevents countries from entering into productive or prob-
lematic relationships is essentially arbitrary. The proposed market,
bracketed by limitations designed to provide appropriate privacy pro-
tections and other safeguards, would distinguish between productive
and problematic transactions on a principled basis.
CONCLUSION
Markets can be powerful tools, coordinating the demand and sup-
ply of all sorts of commodities. In recent years, information has increas-
ingly become just one more good that individuals and businesses find
ways to buy and sell. When countries engage in exchanges of bulk tax-
payer information, they are participating in just such a market. Unfor-
tunately, those intergovernmental exchanges take place in a barter
market that is so incomplete that the resulting exchanges are virtually
certain to leave no one satisfied. The current framework rests on a re-
quirement that governments may only acquire tax information with
identical tax information. In doing so, it fails to accommodate the
many differences among countries and their tax systems that produce a
range of both needs for and abilities to produce tax information. The
result has been a market in which only the most basic extraterritorial
tax information demands-those that are most likely to be common
among all countries-are likely to be met.
The United States, for example, has found itself facing a growing
disparity between the information it collects domestically and the in-
formation it is able to acquire from abroad. At the same time, globaliza-
tion and technological change have made the ability to acquire useful
extraterritorial tax information more important than ever. To acquire
the information it needs for the income tax to function effectively in
today's borderless economy, the United States must abandon the anti-
quated notion of information exchange. Working to create a more
complete market, one more likely to facilitate efficient transactions
than today's barter market, is one possible remedy. The United States
could also choose to (1) promote a supranational effort like the Euro-
pean Union Savings Directive to facilitate cross-border flows of tax in-
formation, (2) unilaterally reduce its dependence on extraterritorial
tax information, or (3) to pursue all of these possibilities simultane-
ousl)y Any of those strategies would be more likely than the current
eighty-year-old barter method to ensure that the United States receives
the extraterritorial tax information it needs.
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